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The decade of the nineties is the watershed
of American history....

On the one aide

lies an Amerioa predom1nant17 agrioultural ••••
On the other aide lies the modern America,
predom1nant17 urban and industrial ••••
HeQr7 Steele Commager
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ABSTRACT

The importance of the, People's
to be found in the

recor~

of the

whioh the existence of the

Part~

part~

part~

of the 1890's i. not

itself, but the efreot

had on the two major political

organisations, and the signiricant contributions made

b~

ex-

Populists who returned to the old parties atter obtaining a
liberal eduoation in Populism.

Beginning with the election of

1890, and continuing through the election of 1896, the Populist
part~

became

progressivel~

more important in AIIIerican politics

as the agent of the dissatisfied .Alllerican farmer unwilling to
realise and unable to adjust to the

DeW

coalitions of econOlllio

lite at the end of the nineteenth c ent~.

The movement repre-

sents, at bottom, the last of a series of poat-Civil War protest movements against the growing power of Urban AIIIerica; but
its most 1IIIportant contribution lies in its educational significanoe, for the Populists were the first group

activel~

campaign for politioal reforms through legislation.
most third

part~

to

Unlike

group's in this oount17, the Populists lived

to see their goals

attained and their platform legislated

into statute, although theirs was not the party to aocomplish
these thing..

That the reform. were acoomplished, by one-t1llle

enelll1es of the People's party, is the most impOl"tant lIingle
faoet of Populi_.
The study beg1na with a survey of the background of
the movement, then deals with the elections of 1892. when
v

Popu1iats fused with Republicans and Democrata to gain power
tor their organization.

The rise ot the tree-silver movement

is examined, and its etteot on the Democratic

part~.

The poai-

tion ot the Popu1iats, and their reaul1;ant dilemma regarding
aooeptance of the Democratio oandidate and plattorm is disoussed,
together with the ettects ot the 1896 election.
oonoluded with a oritique ot Popu1i ••,

The

stud~

is

and an evaluation of how

these influenoes oame about.
Most ot the material was gathered trom
oals, ot whioh Porter

Libr~

haa a

oontempor~

J~gnitioaDt

periodi-

oollection, which

gave an insight into the thoughts and poaitions ot

man~

ot the

most 1DIportant tigures of the time, both aupportera and opponents ot the Popu1ist movement, and trem pertinent
materiala, priaari17 John B. Hicks'

!a!

seconda~

Populiat Revolt. which

was utilized in the tirst two ohapters as a basic reterence,
due to a

paucit~

ot available priaar7 sourc.. during that period

when Popu1iam was thOU8ht ot as too uDimportant to
in periodioala.

occup~

space

Especial17 valuable have been the publioations,

North Amerioan Review, Arena and Forum, and the &Q.al7tioal monthl7,
Review £l Reviewa.

Pertinent

have been utilized when
where

seoond~

abil1t7 ot

secondar~

pr~

sources, when applicable,

materials were unavailable; but

souroes have been cited, olues to the avail-

pr~

materials will be found in the oitationa

noted.

vi

INTRODUCTION
The Populist party was not unique among the third-party
movaments or the post-Civil War nineteenth century in their
utilisation or ruaion with other groups to aid the accomplishments or their desired political ends.

Fusion is basically

the joining together or two ditrerent political organizations
for the election or a alate or candidates upon which both
agree,

and the urging, by the two organizations, or support

for the united group by their respective memberships.

It is,

in errect, a sort or "popular rront" activity carried on
against an opposing party which is, generally, stronger than
the two rusion groups are individually.

Thus when two politi-

cal parties are fused, they are collaborating for a particular election; but there 11 no union or party organizationa,
each ramains autonomous, and there is no guarantee that the
arrangement will contiIIl1e f or more than the duration or the
particular election at question.
The dirrerence between the Populists and the ,other nineteenth century protest movements is that the Populists were
able, through rusion with rirst one party and then another,
to inrluence both parties, gain an 1IIIportance rar out or
proportion to their numbera, and ultimately educate the American people to the acceptance of the reforms which they championed, rerorms which today we take ror granted as part or
our democratic heritage.

vii

The purpose of this narrative is to tell the story of
the significance of fusion movements to the Populist party,
and to the nation as a whole; and to illustrate how, through
fusion, the Populists were able to be assimilated into the
two -Jor parties, where their ideas took root and grew, ulti_tely to flower into the refol'JU of the Progressive movement.
The story of the blooming of political reform in the twentieth
century has been told many times--this is a story of the seedtime.

viii

CHAPTER I

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MOVEMENT
Sectionalism, the ?olitical division of the United States
into areas of differing thoughts and philosophies, was the
main characteristic of nineteenth
history.

0

entury Amerioan political

Nowhere in this oentury is politioal seotionall_

more evident than in the final deoade, when, in the Popu1.ist
movement, agrarian Amerioa staged its last organised effort
to halt the trend toward industrialization and urbanization,
charaoteristic of the twentieth oentury, and was thereby able
to exert an influenoe upon the two great herioan political
parties whioh prepared them for the transition into the great
period of political reform and re-evaluation which has oharacterized Amerioa in the present oentury.
The oauses of Populism. oan be found in the Civil WarJ
for in the fratrioidal strife of the 1860's were born the
situations and oonditions whioh were to influence the American eco1'lOll1y for the rest of the century, and to bring into
being the forces whioh, in their clashing interests and alas,
were to give birth to the Populist upria1ng, and leave an
indelible imprint upon American politics even to the present
day.
Three basic eoonomio oonditione of this period form
the background for Populism, namely, the settlement of the
western territOries, the impoverishment of the South, and the
1

2
rlse in tne Hortheast

or great buslness and lndustrlal empire••

The Clvll War made dra.tic changes ln the Amerlcan econOlllY,
and o 000 CIIII1tantly , brought great changes ln the thinklng of
the people ot the United State., tar ln the 1 aat twenty-tive
year. ot the nineteenth'oentury not only the political but
also the intellectual l1te ot the people ot thi. country emphaslzed one subJect--Economics. l
The economio diftlcultl.s whioh led to the Populist movement were centered ln the West, which, ln the days tollowing
the Civll War, rapidly bec8llle changed frCllll a reglon of graaslands and wllderne•• , to booming communltles and broad wheat
flelds.

Thanks to the Homestead Act ot 1862, which enabled

settlers to obtain deeds to farms ln the West by payment ot a
nOlll1nal cost, Union veterans and their t8m1l1es began to tlow
ln increasing numbers to the lands ot Kansas, Hebraska, and
the Dakotas, where land was theirs for the taking, and, aocording to the publ1clty given lt b,. railroad brochures,
"oneaper
East. 2

and

aore eall1l,. tllled" than the lands ot the

Instrumental ln the settllng of these areas were tne
railroad., whioh, tollowing the Civll War, were th_selves
experlenoing great periods of expansion, and the gradlng ot
new rall_,. rlghta-ot-_,. was placing tracks throughout the
lFrank B. Tracy, "Rlse and Doom ot the Populist Part,.,"
Forum, XVI (OCtober, 1893), 240.
2John D. Hicks, ~ Popullst Revolt, p. 12.

.3
plains.

Because of tremendous grants of public land. given

to various western railroads by the federal government,.3 the
carriers were especially anxious to secure settlement in the
West.

Hot only would increased we.tern .ettle-ent give the

railroads the opportunity of dispo.ing of their govermnent
land. at a tidy profit, but settlement of the West was absolutely necessary for the railroad. to survive. for no railroad oould exist in the plains states without .CIIle fo1'lll of
revenue to sustain it. and the revenue for the Union Paoific,
Burlington, Santa Pe and other line. was going to originate
with the farmers who oould be induced to settle in areas
clo.e to the tracks. and to grow crops for .hipment to eastern
muket ••
While in the

South~

the econOlllY whioh was nearly destroyed

by the Civil War would take decades to revive. and a crop-lien
system of agricultural finanoing placed the Reconstructed
South in the same one-erop dile_a which had plagued it for
generations. 4 the We.t was the exact opposite.
psychology daainated everything.

The ~OClll"

Land was cheap,and fertile,

prices were high. profit. were to be had everywhere, and a
wave of

ma..

speculation and optlmi. . .ettled over the West.

Town. sprang up almost overnight, and

~ediately

voted bonds

for construction of utility companie.. .treet railways. and
other expensive and unnece•• &r7 luxurie..

Town. rivaled each

.3I!!.!2.., pp. .3-4.
4Fred A. Shannon. EconClD.1c Histon ot ~ People ot the
United State•• p. 411.

4
other for railroads, and many small cOllllDUl11tie. were served
by two or lIIOre cOlllpeting companies. 5

~d while towna and

villages were bonding thelll8elve. to the lbdt, individuu
farmer. were taking advantage of the -readily-available cash
which loan cc.panies had for their convenience, by investing
in equipment, land, and livestock.

Debts were everYwhere,

but nobody worried, because the rains came, the crops grew,
and the profits continued.
But not for long.

The artificial prices which had been

the basis of the economr during the late 1860'. fell, due in
great degree to the removal from circulation of approximately
one-fourth billion dollars, in greenbacks, .hort-term treasury

-

notes and other obligations.

6

Because of this, the amount of

circulating medium, per capita, dropped from $31.18 to $20.10,
and the general baae-price index dropped from 132 to 87. 7
This, coupled with exorbitant railroad rates, as much aa twothird. the market price of wheat, cau.ed the farmer'. economic
situation to deteriorate. 8
.l cru.hing blow came in 1873 when, precipit8;ted by the

severe los.e. sutfered by insurance cc.panie. in the Chicago
and Boston fire., and the unloading of American securities
by European f1rlll8 because of a panic on the Vienna .tock
5aicks, ~. ~., p. 29.
6Shannon, ~. ill., p. 460.
7Ibid •

8Ibid•• p. 461.

5
market, there vas a rusn ot liquidation on Wall Street, most
tamous of vnicn vas the collap.e of tne t1rJll ot Ja'1 Cooke
and CallPaD7. 9

Farmers and agricultural caamun1tie. vere

caught betveen talling prices, nign costs and a scarcity ot
money on tne one nand, and intere.t pa,.ents and pecun1U7
obligations based on cheap aone'1 on the otner.

Tbe boca va.

over, but tne vorst vas yet to ccae.
Tbe tarmers and tbe rarm caamun1ties managed to survive
tne ·Panic ot 1873,· although man'1 individuals vere rorced
into bankruptc'1 and many towns disappeared or shrank considerabll'1 in .ize.

Due to a .eries ot good crop '1ears,

when adequate rainfall at tne right time brought rorth good
yields, the tarmer kept afloat, although. otten forced to
rel'1 on the product. vnicn he h1IIlaeU could raise, depending
as little as possible on commoditie. tor wnioh casn payaent
had to be made.

Tbia precarious situation continued ror a

decade, in whicb tne rarm-ba.ed

econ~

or the prairies

managed to keep alive.
In 1881 another traged'1 came, in the l' orm of drought,
and ror man'1 a pioneer who bad .urvived 1813 and tne '1ears ot
hard times, the dreams ot riches in tne new land. ot the West
became nigntmare. ot bankrupto'1 and dereat.

As the summer

wore on, and tne hot, dry wind. continued to blow, crop
prospeot. declined precipitou.l'1.

_.

9Ibid

Kone'1 became scarce,

6

prices dropped, foreclosures became even more common and
countless numbers of speculators, farmers, businessmen and
bankers were destroyed. 10 Cattle, crops and confidence were
gone, not to return again for a decade.
The great droughts which began in 1887 brought to a climax a movement which had been growing among farmers throughout
the West and South for several years, expressing the farmer's
desire to rid himself of the stranglehold held on him by the
railroads, the loan companies and the industrial empires of
the Northeast.

As early as 1870

~ertain

discontented groups

among the settlers in the West were already beginning to
voice their opposition to the economic situation in which
they found themselves.

A meeting was held in the State House

at Topeka, Kansas, February 9, 1870, for the purpose of organizing a Workingman's Party, which, in non-industrial Kansas,
meant a Farmer's Party.

At this meeting a speech was made

favoring the distribution of public lands, allocated for use
by the railroads, to individual homesteaders. ll

The sugges-

tion was rejected at this meeting, but two years later it was
formally adopted by the Liberal Republican party, a political
organization which was formed that same year. 12
Two years later, in 1874, an organization was formed in
Lampasas County, Texas, which in various forms, spread

10 Hicks,

£!1.,

p. 31.
llElizabeth N. Barr, "The Populist Uprising," in A
Standard History of ansas and Kansans, II, 1123-1124.-

12Ibid •

~.

1
throughout tne South and Weat .13

This w aa the Farmers' Alliance

movement, llbich soon waa able, by capitalizing on the natural
miafortunes which befell the farmer, and on the eoonOlll1c entanglements with which he found himself burdened, to take the
plaoe of the Patrons of' Huabandr,., the Grange, and other early
farm reform groupa,14 and emerge "a powerful organization for
political reaistance to political wrong and injustioe."15

A

supporter of the movement characterized it as "The attempt a
of a people to wreat oontrol of the means of livelihood t rom
the hands of corporat e power ••• , "16 and even its oritios admitted that: "It was made neceaaary as a means of resiatanoe
to legalized monopoly, to legalized tax-robbery, to trusts
••• and to the acoumulated advantage a given to oorporationa
and great oombines by the legislation of the country .1t11

The farmers had mloh to complain about, and little hope
of aecuring redress tor their grievances through politioal
meane, for although in 1810 farty-aeven per oent of the AD.rioan people were engaged in agriculture only seven per cent of
the membera of Congress were direotly conneoted

~ith

the aoil,

and even in suoh predominantly agricultural atatea as Iowa,
the railroada were so aeoure politically that they oould
nominate their man, Willi_ B. Alliaon, for the aenate, and
be confident of his eleotion. 18
13S 0 1 0n J. Buck, !!!!. '"arian Crusade, p. 111.
14Ibid., p. 112.
l5John T. Morgan, ItThe Danger of the Farmers' Alliance,"
Forum, XII (November, 1891), 406.
l~arr, 100. cit., p. 1123.

11

--

Morgan, loco cit., p. 406.
18shannon, - ; . cit., pp. 461, 464.

8
By 1888 the Farmera' Alliance had spread to enoompass
moat of agrioultural Amerioa, being espeoially atrong in the
South and in the statea of the.prairie West, the Middle
Border.

The Alliance foroes were aotively agitating for the

control of corporations, especially railroads, by the government, for devaluaUng the currency, and for lessening the
tariff.

In that year, in spite of the devastating drouth

which occurred the previous year, the

f~ers

of Nebraska

still blamed economic rather than natural causea for their
plight.

A questionnaire was sent to farmers by the Nebraska

State Board of Agricultur., and while there were only
seventy-fourrepliea, the results give saae indication of the
frame of

~nd

or

the farmera of that state.

Twenty-five of

the farmera liated the credit situation as the cause of their
difficulty; fourteen, high intereat rates; eleven each named
the railroads and the tariff; and thirteen named minor
pointa. 19
It is interesting to observe that none named
drought.

Other polls in Kanaas and the Dakotas revealed s1m1lar thoughts in the minda or resid.nts of those 8tates. 20
But in apite of the many grievancea which farmers in the
Weat and South had in common, they were unable to bring conoerted political aotion to bear to achieve concrete support
for th.ir position.

Thia was due to the diviaion of the

19Hallie Faraer, -Economic Baokground of Frontier
Populism," Miaaiaa:m Vallei Historical Review, X (Maroh,
er cIte as M. V. H. R.)
1924>, 426. (Here
20~.

- - - -

9

liliance movement into two basic groups, a Southern liliance,
comprising the Southern states, and later the states of KanAas
and South Dakota, and a Northern or Northwestern liliance,
compriaing the r_ainder of the stat.s of the Middle Border
or prairies.

The division was cauaed because of the basioally

seoret character of the Southern group, with its ritual and
segregation of Negroes, and the Northerners' insistence upon
federal regulation of the sale of substitutes for hog lard,
which did not appeal to the cotton growers of the South. 2l
Beoause of this basio weakness, and beoause the farmers
still refused to believe that the way to political reform was
not through the established politioal parties, the Union
Labor tioket got little support, even though it advooated
many of the reforms which the farmers themselves favored. 22
While more than half of the Union Labor vote was froa the four
states of Kansas, Texas, Missouri and Arkansas,23 its weakness
as a sounding-board for the views of farmers was evidenoed,
and the farmers went to the polls in 1888 still supporting
the traditional two-party system.
By 1890, however, the eoonomio plight of the farmer had
reaohed suoh a desperate state that he was ready for action.
The base-prioe index oontinued to drop (it reaohed 29.6 in
1896, the lowest on record), and the amount of money in
21
Shannon, .22,. cit., p. 478.
22Buck, .22,. ~., p. 128.
23~., p. 127.

10
ciroulation per capita sank to below $20. 24

The price of cot-

ton fell to 7.7 centa per pound, nearly 1.$ oenta lower than
the previous decade, and the pricea for corn and wheat dropped
to average a of 36!7 oenta'and 67.3 oents reapectively.2$

More

than thirty-five per cent of all farms operated by owners were
mortgaged, and capital

was being drained away frOlll the West

and South by loan cOlllpan1es to a greater and greater extent. 26
.An "appallingll number of farma had been sold for taxea,

and even larger nuabers had been foreclosed by mortgage
holders, who, aince many tarms were mortgaged for more than
their cash value, held judgmenta against farmers even atter
forecloaure.

For example, a farmer may have mortgaged his

farm for $1,$00, but the farm may have been valued at only
1,000 when foreclosed, leaving the tarmer still owing a $$00
27
judgment. Many farmers, faced with these circumatances, gave
up all hopes of aurviving, and began the long trek eastward.

One observer could reo all seeing as many aa tour or tive
wagons carped overnight in aight of his hOllIe, each wagon
representing a family which had been llstarved
and this, in 1890, was a oommon sight. 28

out~

of Kansasi

24Shannon, nne cit., p. 461.
~~., p. 477.
26
~., pp. 477-478.

25

27personal interview with Professor O. F. Grubba, Pittsburg, Kansas.

_.

?8Ibid

11

The situation had became so severe in Kansas that the
members of the Farmers' Alliance realized that they must
abandon the announced polioy of the Alliance, and actively
enter their own

candid~tes

in the political fight for better-

ment of their economic status.

While the Alliance had for-

mally declared that the organization would not ·nominate or
support an man or set ot .en tor oftioe as a distinct politi-

29

cal party,· the tarmers began to see that their only hope lay
in getting their own candidates elected to office.

There-

tore, following the 1888 election, the Kanaas tarmers began
to organize politically, using the machinery of the Alliance.
They selected a group of organizers, mostly former Republican
office-holders who had became dissatisfied with their party
because of thwarted political ambitions, and set these people
to organizing the oounties of the state. 30 By 1890 the organizational work had progreued to such an extent that a state
oonvention of officers of the new Alliance party was held at
Topeka, Maroh 25, when a resolution, announcing that ·we will
no longer divide on party lines, and will only oast our
votes for oandidates of the people, for the people, and by
the people,· was passed. 3l In August of the same year a
state nominating convention was held, ¥bioh selected a tull
slate ot state, congressional and county oandidates. 32 With
29w. F. Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement in Kansas-Origin of the People's Party," Transactions .2! !B!. Kansas
State Historical Societl, IX, 2.
30 Ibid., 4.
3 1 Ibid., 5.
32~. The Il&IU ·People' 8 Party" had already been
chosen ~the new organ1zatiOR.

12

this aotion, the interest of the Allianoe in Kansas was transferred to the newly-organized party.
The new party had at its disposal a ready-made pressure
group in the Alliance farmers, with their
oal consciousness.

newly-fo~d

politi-

The farmers, pressed to the wall by eco-

nomic necessity, were made-to-order ror political organization, and readily found tongues to utter their battle-cry
class warfare:

or

"The West and South are bound and prostrate

before the manufaoturing East," was their cry; and they
began to organize the fight which they hoped would end the
system which "clothes rascals in robes and honesty in rags."33
Throughout Kansas farmers arose earlier than usual on
many days during the summer

or

1890, hurried through the

"chores," loaded their families onto wagons, and drove into
town, where a mass rally for Alliance candidates would be
held.

A festival air prevailed, with the farm WaDen bringing

picnic lunches, to be consUllled on the c curt-house lawn, bands
playing, and speeches throughout the day by the candidates of
the newly-formed party.34

The movement quickly spread

throughout the Middle Border, with similar Alliance organizations appearing in Nebraska and the Dakotas, although the main
strength of the movement at this time was oentered in the
state of its birth.
33Barl', -100. cit., p. 1150.
34Personal in~view with Proressor

o. F. Grubbs.

13
The People's Party was bleased with several oratora, who
toured the rural areaa, addreaaing hundreds of groups, and
always dealing with the same theme--economics.

They pointed

out that while, in the decades from 1870 to 1890 the growth
of capital wealth in the United States totaled about
$25,000,000,000. the farmer's share was only an eatimated
2.500.000.00035 and they Joined together in meetinga throughout the prairie statea to sing:
I was a party man one time
The party would not mind me
So now I'm working for myaeU,
The party's left behind me.
A true and independent IUD
You ever more ahall find me-I work and vote and ne'er f2~get
The part,. left behind .e.)O
The "true and independent" farmers in 1890 began their
organised political campaign with a reapectable show of
strength.

In November the,. succeeded in electing nearly

fifty congreasmen who had "Alliance leaning." and nine

who

stood "aolidlY together as a .~parate organization" in the
House of Representatives. 37 Theae aiRe, were alaoat all
from the Weat, and they represented four atate.: Jerry
Simpaon, John G. Otia. John DaYia. Ben H. Glover and William
Baker were from Kansas; O. M. Kelll and W. A. McKeighan repreaented Nebraska; Thamaa E. Watson vas a GeDrgian. and K.
35John W. Bookwalter, "The Farmer's Iaolation and the
Re..dy," Forum. XII (September, 1891), 51.
36a!cka. 2E.. E1,•• p. 168.
37Hamlin Garland liThe Alliance Wedge in Congre8ll."
Arena, V (March. l892J. 447.

Halvors.n r.pr.sent.d Minn.sota. 38

In addition. the Allianc.

candidat.s were abl., in Kansas and N.braska, to .ecur. majoriti.s in the stat. legi.la:tur.s which r.sult.d, in Kan.as, in
the .lection ot W. A. P.tter, an Allianc. candidat., to the
Unit.d Stat.s Senat••

In other w.st.rn stat.s Alliance

candidat.s polled large blocks ot vot.s, and throughout the
South the old-guard D.mocratic party was either complet.ly
d.t.at.d or thoroughly scar.d. 39
Th.s. succ••••s prompt.d increased agitation tor a tormal third-party movement among tarm.rs, and this id.a was
pressed by m.mbers ot the Kansas d.l.gation at a m••ting ot
the Allianc. at OCala, Florida, in D.c.mb.r ot that year.
Congre8sman-elect -Sockless" Jerry Simpson pl.aded tor the
organisation ot a formal party, on the mod.l ot the Kansas
P.ople's Party, but his mov.. w.re blocked by the Southern
memb.rs ot the .ulianc.. who were dIIterm1ned to achieve their
reforms by gaining control ot the D_ocratic party in the
South by unseating the -Bourbon aristocrats- which controlled
it. 40
The main 8igniticance

or

the OCala meeting, however, was

the issuance by the .uliance ot six demands which they belleved badc to the survival

or

38Ibid •
39Hicks ,

22,.

cit., p. 206.

40~., pp. 207-208.

the tarmer and the nation's

economy.

The Ocala demands included the abolition of national

banks; a sub-treasury plan for government loans and storage
of farm cODll1odities; the increase of the emount of currenoy in
circulation; the forbidding of speculating on grain and land;
free ooinage of silver; abolition of tariffs, and government
control of the means of transportation and commnn1cation.4l
The formal adoption of the slate'of demands at Ocala
gave further stimulUll to the movUlent for a separate political organization by which to implement them.

This lIlovement

was further aided by the .uliance congrell8men, who, operating
as a separate "fU'll1 bloe" in the House ot Representatives,
disanoeiated the .uliance movement trom the two political
parties.

.1t a meeting of the Northern .uliance at <&alla,

Nebraska, January, 1891, the delegates passed resolutions
reiterating the Ocala demands, and adopted a plan whereby a
petition was to be circulated in all the farm states calling
tor a national convention to meet in 1892 tor the purpose ot
setting up a formal political organization and nc::m1nating
candidates for president and vice-president. 42

~d scenes of

bitter internal strife, the formal party organization vas
finally agreed upon, and the birth of the People's Party as
a national organization beceme imminent •
.1s

the lIlain opposition to the formation of a t1:l1rd

party vas located in the South, 1DImediate pressure was put to
4 1 See .1ppendix I. For a discussion of the sub-treasury,
see C. C. Post, "The Sub-Treasury Plan,· .Arena, V (February,
1892), 351-3.52.
4 2H1cks, ~. cit., p. 210.
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bear on that section by members of the Kansas Alliance, which
was a member ot the Southern Alliance although a western
state.

Jerry Simpson, Senator Petter. Mrs. Mary Elizabeth

Lease, Mrs. Anna L. Digga and other campaign veterans ot the
battles of 1890 toured 'the South. urging the dilsatistied to
join with them under the banner of the People's party.43
While sOllIe Alliance supporters claimed that the thirdparty etforts altered the basio tenet. ot the Alliance movement, and -its noble mission hal been degraded into a disreputable hunt after ottice,_44 most argued with Senator
Petter that: -The party has a good and sufticient excuse tor
ita existence. -45

The tarmer's probl_s remained. and the

congre.s elected in 1890 didnot seem able to alter them.
-Finance. land, and transportationl--these were the three
tields which the tarmer belleved that he must control if he
were to live,_4 6 and the Congress did not .e_ anxious to
have him control th_.

The tarmer was still in the predica-

ment of having to save himself. by political me ana • trOlll. the
penalty tor his failure to adjust to econOlll1o

oo~ditions.

As Senator Petfer said:

43Barr, 122.. ill., p. 1154.
!+4Morgan, loco cit., p. 406.
4Sw. A. Petter. -The Passing ot the People's Party,Horth American Review. CLIVI (January, 1898), 12.
46
Farmer, ~. i l l.• p. 427.
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The general level of prices fell to the
cost line or below it, and the people were
paying seven to ten per cent annual interest
on an enormous private debt. Personal property in towns and cities was rapidly passing
beyond the view of the tax-gatherer. Agriculture was prostrate. Farmers ware at the mercy of speculators; the earth had came under
the domination of landlords; forests and
mines were owned by syndicates; railway companies were in combination; wealth and social
influence had usurped power, and the seat pf
government was transferred to Wall Street.41
The result of these arguments was a gradual acceptance
of the third-party idea, an "organized demand that the functions of government shall be exercised only for the mutual
benefi t of all the people. ,,48

Support for the third party

grew as the farmers and their spokesmen continued their campaign, proclaiming that government is useful only when it advances the common weal, and that "public good is paramount to
private interest,,,49 and vowing that they would protest "the
producing masses against the spoilation of speculators and
usurers. ,,50
The climax of the campaign for the organization of the
new party came when a plenary session of the

int~rested

Alliance members and others was held in St. Louis on Washingtonls birthday, 1892.

The third party forces agreed to hold

a general nominating convention in Omaha, Nebraska, on the
41peffer, "Passing of Party," loco cit., p. 12.
A. Peffer, "The Mission of the Populist Party,"
North American Review, eLV!! (December, 1893), 665.

46w.

49~.
50~.
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Fourth of July of that year (the Populists believed in the
auspiciousness of national holidays as portending success for
their venture).

At the latter meeting the People1s Party

brought forth a national 'platform upon which their candidate
for the presidency was ,to conduct his campaign.

The platform

was summed up as:
1. An exclusively national currency in
amount amply sufficient for all the uses for
which money is needed by the people, to consist
of gold and silver coined on equal terms, and
government paper, each and all legal tender in
payment of debts of whatever nature or amount,
receivable for taxes and all public dues.
2. That rates of interest for the use of
money be reduced to the level of average net
profits in productive 1 industries.

3. That the means of transportation be
brought under public control, to the end that
carriage shall not cost more than it is
reasonably worth, and that charges may be
made uniform.

4. That large ~rivate land-holdi
discouraged by law.~l

s be

For their candidate for President, the People1s Party
named General James B. Weaver of Iowa, an old-time thirdparty war horse and one-time presidential candidate for the
Greenback Party, and as his running-mate selected General
James G. Field of Virginia, creating the interesting situation of having on the same ticket a former Union general and
a former Confederate.

While there was some opposition to

Weaver as a candidate, because of his former association
with the defunct Greenback cause, he was easily nominated by
51Ibid., p. 666.
See Appendix II for the financial
planks or-the platform.
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a Tote ot 995 to 275 over his only opponent, Senator James H.
Kyle of South Dakota, who very reluctantly opposed him. 52
Field handily deteated another ex-rebel, Ben Terrell ot
Texas, for the vice-presidential spot.by a vote ot 733 to
554. 53
.Amid scenes of general rejoicing the convention ended
and the Populists 54 got down to the task before them, publicising their issues and proselyting voters for the November
elections.

Enthusiastically they set about their taalc, con-

tidently justifying their position by laying "tllird parties
never exist unless there be occasion for tllem, ,,55 'and pointing out to tile electorate at tile United States tllat tile
occasion was obviously at Iland.

For, atter all, did not tile

People's Party consist at:
••• the wealtll producers ••• or tile republic. They are the largest and the best class
in our population; our detense 10 war and our
sateguard in peace.... They are united 10 a
common purpose ••• in detense at those principles whj,Qh insure a prosperoul and enduring
nation.50
52Hicks, ~. cit., p. 236.
53 Ibid •
54The nl.lDll Populists was soon adopted 10 common usage.
It wal made necelsary because or the need to haTe an adjecti val torm at the party naae, since People's Party was awkward in descriptions; since one could delcribe himselt as a
Re~ublican or a Democrat, but could not very well say he was
a People's." The origlo of the word Populist i8 trrOlll the
Latlo, Populares, the name ot a party in ROIIIe which wal
organized a8 a popular front mov_ent to combat the party of
the wealtlly, or Opt1mate8, during the period or the ROIIIall
repUblic, 178-133, B.C.--Interview with Professor Grubb8.
55James H. Kyle.l "The Pending Political Campaign,"
Arena, VI (August, 1~92), 309.
56Ibid ., p. 310.
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While many persons treated the newly-born party with
scorn,57 other observers presciently pointed out that "the
movement is not to be treated with disd&1n."5 8 One contemporary periodical editorialized that: "The People's Party demands
the nationalization of railroads and of various other corporate
or monopolistic services; and they will same day bring these
questions to a front Place.- 59
The Populist claim that the burden of debts was too great
for individuals to Jresolve without government assistance got
them into some difficulties with opposition newsPaPers, even
in the Populist state of Kansas, where one editor ccmaented
that:

-There are evils enough to cCllllbat without distorting

the truth and slandering the state for purely political purposes."6O

But while newspapers and RepUblic ans in Kansas and

el8ewhere in the Wlut, and Democrats in the South alternately
scoffed at and d8llll1ed the People's Party, the "true and independent men" were busily thinking about their favorite intellectual appetizer--econamics, and were adding up the score of
the Harrison administration and the promises made to them of
a gold standard and an economic status guo, whioh both
57 0ne scoffer was disposed of by Jerry Simpson, who,
when asked by a G.O.P. congres~ to tell about Kansans
burning corn repUed: "Yes, they did burn corn, and by the
light of that burning cern they read the h1storl of the
RepubUcan PartIe That 11 why the Peoples (Ai!!.J Party carried the state.
Quoted in Annie L. Diggs, !a! Stort ~
Jerrz Simpson, pp. 118-119.
5 8 "The Meaning of the Movement," Review of Reviews,
VI (August, 1892), 10.
59Ibid •
60Pi'ttSburg We.k1t Headlight, VIII (October 29, 1891).
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parties vouchsafed them in their 1892 platforms and which
both candidates, Harrison for the Republicans and Cleveland
for the Democrats, upheld.
A typical spokesman·was Henry

C~bot

Lodge, who typified

the views of both the Republicans and "hard money" Democrats
when he admitted that "free coinage and the tariff will form
two leading issues of 1892.,,61

But to Senator Lodge a third

question "of equal magnitude and greater importance" was that
of election and ballot reform. 62 He, like many of his Democratic colleagues, failed to recognize the basic seriousness
of the demands of the People's Party, and the basic unhappiness and distress of the farmers, both Western and Southern.
The People1s Party did receive some support, albeit
rather half-hearted support, from organized labor.

Terence

V. Powderly, president of the Knights of Labor, happily
announced that there were thousands who "long for a change,
not from the rule of Republicanism to that of Democracy--so
called--but to a new and honest party;,,63 and while he
pointed out that 1892 may not be the year for that party to
elect a candidate for the presidency, he nonetheless declared that "every

~lorkingman,

every thinking man, and every

patriot should cast his vote for the candidate of the People1s
party this year.,,64
61Henry Cabot Lodge "The Political Issues of 1892,"
Forum, XII (September, 1891), 104.
62 Ibid •

6-

3Terence V. Powderly, "Wanted, a New Party," North
American Review, CLV (November, 189~), 595.
64 Ibid

_.

-
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While gloomily predicting that it would make little difference to organized labor whether Republicans, Democrats or
Populists were eleoted in 1892, Samuel Gampers, president

or

the American Federation of Labor, did admit that "acting upon
the principle 'of all evils ohoose the least,'" labor would

~ore generally co-operate with the People's party.,,65 He
hastened to point out, however, that the Populists were not a
"labor" party, and were compoeed mostly of "employing farmers
without

any regard to the interest or the ellPloyed farmers .... " 66

To all outward appearances the summer and early fall of
1892 were unique in American election-year experiences, for
the unconcern on the p art of the electorate was pronounced.
While a leading Democrat oautioned that "the present oalm,
emounting to seeming apathy, which had marked the opening

or

the oampaign on both sides, must not be quickly construed as
due entirely to indifference to the resu]t; ,,67 a aore realistic Republican approach admitted that "the lack or exoitement
and or active interest in the ••• campaign ••• is a reature
oommon to both parties.

For a period of more than three

months atter the nominations were made, the country gave no
intimation or any special concern in the result.,,68
65Semuel Gompers, "Organized Labor in the C&lllpaign,"
North Amerioan Review, CLV (July, 1892), 93.
66 Ibid

_.

67w. F. Harrity, Chairman or the Democratic National
Committee, "The Democratio Outlook," North American Review,
CLV (November, 1892), 552.
68James G. Blaine, "Presidential Election or 1892,"
North Amerioan Review, CLV (November, 1892), 513.
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The proteaaional

politici~,

however, did not have their

ears close eno\J8h to the political ground to detect the tremors

ot the elec tora! earthquake wilich, while it would do no aerious
damage to their party structures, wOUld give them a pretty
thorough ahaking.

liov8mber, 1892, was the beginning ot the

end tor much ot which tile nineteenth century had taken tor
granted or had resisted only paasively.

CHAPTER II
EARLY FUSION MOVlim:NTS STRENGTHEN POPULISM
By the autumn ot 1892 thetorces which were to comprise
the bulk ot Populist strength were in a relatively strong
political position.

The depression which had caused the eco-

nomic ditticulties leading to the tounding ot the movement
was still ettecting tremendous suttering upon the debt-ridden
tl.l"lllllrs ot the West; and in the South, caught between the
one-orop system on the one hand and the one-party syst_ on
the other, many erstwhile Democrats were becoming more and
more unhappy.

Since there was practically no Populist

strength in the

state~

North ot the Ohio and East of the

MisSissippi,l the workers of the People's Party set their
sights on the West and South, where they hoped to win victories a1gnificant enough to give them a strong bargaining position in the Congress, and to establish a toundation upon
which to build future political triumphs.
To accompli8h this, however, they knew theY,could not
work alone.

Nowhere was the political 8trength ot the

~o reasons are apparent for this: firat, the farmer8
of thia erea were close to markets and theretore not plagued
with the high transportation costs ot the Westerners, and,
having settled longer on their lands, were not burdened with
the mortgage debts which so severely handioapped the Western
farmers. Secondly, many ot the voters of thi8 area were wage
workers, whose ideas were diametrioally opposed to the Populist8, tor they were in favor ot low prices for farm commodities, and high wages for labor.

2$

movement, still but two years old, enough to ottset the entrenched power of the two traditional parties.

The only way

the Populists felt they could hope tor victory was through
arrangements whereb,. at least part ot: the strengtb arra,.ed
against them would be eliminated.

This tbe Populiats boped

to do, but as it turned out, this was what was done for them
by tbeir former opponents.
In the Weat the Populiata hoped 10 0 appeal to discontented groups within tbe Democratic party; in the Middle
Border to persons dissatisfied with Republican domination,
and in the far Weat to tree-silver advocates unbapp,. with
their party's atand on the money queation.

In the case ot

the Democrats they tound a group in many caa.. willing to
co-operate, for the supporters of the Democrac,. were in a
weak political position in the band of statea aettled primarily by ex-Union soldiera.

In the statea ot Kanaas, Ne-

braska, the Dakotas and Minneaota the torces ot the Alliance
had, in 1890, administered stinging defeata. to the old
Republican groups; and in theae atates the

Peop~e's

Party

was in a tavorable political position, having taken over
the candidates and issuea ot the tarm groups.

Here the

question centered around the problem ot whether to attempt
a Unilateral victory over bdth parties or, in a coalition
with the Demoorata, be anured ot much greater bope tor
Victory, witb a resultant obligation to sbare the spoila.
The Democrats, in many cases, were anxious for fuaion,
if tor no other reason than to see victory taken trom their
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old enemies. the Republicans.

For them it was good politics

to work tor a Republican deteat, even though they might not
gain the victory. 2 But to counterbalance this thought was
the tear ot what the PopUlists might do when and i t they got
control ot the state governments, and this gave pause to many
who advocated a union with the new party.
In the end, tuaion was accompliahed in only two ot the
border statea, Kansas and North Dakota, and in both ot these
instanoes it was brought about primarily upon the instigation
of the D_ocrats. 3
In Kanaas, the two parties agreed upon a cClllllllon slate of
candidates, state, elect.oral, and congressional; nearly all
the nominee. being Populists.

At the D_ocratic state con-

vention the motion was made for the endorsement of the whole
Populiat state ticket, and while the idea was tought savagely
for some six hours by recalcitrant groupa within the party,
the issue was finally decided by an aftirmative vote, taken
at three o'olock the next morning, with the tinal tabulation
showing 390 Democrata tavoring fusion on the pres,idential
electoral alate, while only thirty-nine OPposed. 4

On the

state ticket, 226 delegates vot.d to support the Populist
candidat.s, while 116 wi.hed to nominate a separate slate of
Democratic oandidate•• 5 Th. reaulta ot the balloting would

Zw. F. Harrington, "The Populiat Party in Kana..," in
Collection. at the Kansa. State Historical Society, XVI
(192$), 423.-3Hicka, ~. !!i., p. 256.

4Harrington, loc. cit., p.
5Ibid •

423.
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seem to indicate a greater entbusiasm on tbe part of tbe
Democrats of Kansas to deprive Harrison of tbe electoral votes
of tbat state tban to put into tbe atate bouae tbe nominees of
tbe new p/U'ty.
While some disgruntled Democrats proceeded to bold anotber
state convention in Kansaa, and advised votera to defeat tbe
Populists at tbe polls, tbe only effect of tbls move was to
alienate tbemselves in tbe eyea of tbeir fellow party-members,
for the only way to defeat the Populists would be to vote for
tbe Republican ticket, sinee tbia
:make any nominationa. 6

"rump"

oonvention did not

In North Dakota the same procedure was followed, with
tbe Democratic oonvention endorsing the Populist oandidatea,
wbo had already been nominated by tb8ir own party, with tbe
major difference being that the electoral tioket included
both Cleveland and Weaver electors. 7
Ignatiua Donnelly, the Populist oandidate for Governor
of Minneaota, was inatrumental in quelling the fuaion movement
in tbat atate, because he was confident tbat the People'a
Party would be able, on ita own, to elll8rge viotorious; and he
was not anxious to be under any obligation tothe Democrats. 8
Two Democrats, bowever, were nominated by the Populists for
Supreme Court positions because tbe Populista were sbort of
6Appleton'a Annual Cyclopedia, 1892, pp. 370-371.

7Ibid., p. 530.
8JObn D. Hicka, "Tbe Politioal Career of Ignatiua
Donnelly," ~. !. ~. ~., VIII (June-September, 1921), 123.
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lawrers, and in return four Populiata were endorsed by the
Democrats as presidential electors. 9
In Soutb Dakota and Nebraska fusion between Democrats
and Popullllta took plaoe only on tbe ioeal level, witb three
oomplete state and electoral tiokets in tbe tield in botb
states.
In tbe Western states, wbere the ailver question was the
primary topio ot politioal diacussion, 10 the Populists, with
their strong tree-coinage plank, received mucb aupport whioh
oame to them tor no other reaaon tban this.
tbe Western statea

The Populism of

waa oentered on thia one isaue, and be-

cause of this empbasis, many Democrats and Silver Republicans
joined witb the newccmers.

In Nevada and Colorado, botb im-

portant silver-mining atates, thia movement waa most pronounoed.

In tbe former state tbe aaverick groups formed a

splinter party, known as the Silver party, whioh sent delegates to the People's Party oonvention at.

amaba ,

ly endorsed the Populiat prea1dential oandidate. ll

and officialIn Colo-

rado, the Democrats officially endorsed Davis R. Waite, the
Populist oandidate for Governor, and the rest of the People's
Party tioket. 12 In Wyoming and Idaho fusion arrangementa were
worked out between the Populiats and Democrata, witb tbe silver issue serving to bind the two groupa togetber. 1 )

_.

9Ibid

10See Chllpter III for a complete diacuaaion of this isaue.
URicks, .!?!!.. ill.• p. 265.
l2 Ibid
l)Ibid.

_.
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The emphasis upon the silver question by the Western
states was not a healthy sign for the new party, for it signified that the party leaders were able to abandon many of the
planks of the Omaha platform for the politioal expedient of
gaining alliea for the fall eleotion.

The silver plank was

emphasized, the other planks ignored in the West.

Of oourse,

the Western miner had samething in oommon with the farmer of
the Middle Border in the hardship caused by the recession,
oaused partly by the loss of the silver market, but the Populist strength of the Weat was artifioial at best.

An agrarian

reform movement was out of plaoe in the states of the Rooky
Mountaina.
In the South the Populists concentrated primarily upon
oooperation with Republican minority groups, in an attempt to
defeat the entrenched Democratic party.14

The movement of

the Populist party in the South was handicapped, however, by
the fact that the influences of the Civil War, whioh played
a signifioant part in bringing about the t'ormation of the
party in the West, were to be equally significant 'in hindering its development in the states of the former Confederacy.
Having only reoently

ful~reoovered

the politioal con-

trol of the Southern states fram the hands of the Reconstruction governments, the Democratic party of the South was not
anxious to let it go back into the clutohes of the Republioans and Negroes, whose years of Reconstruction rule were
memories too near and too vivid to allow them any camplacency.
14Solon J. Buck, !!!!. Warian Crusade, p. 148.
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Since the Democrats of the South were in such political
strength in their area that they did not need the Populists,
and since the only allies the Populists could hope to obtain
were Negroes and Republicans, the movement suffered severely.
The groups to which the Populists would logically turn for
strength, the small farmers, were the very ones who were most
bitter against the Negroes and the G. 0. P., the People's
Party's potential allies. 15

The Democratic party in the

South was more than a political organization, it was the
organization which stood for the maintenance of white supremacy and white sovereignty against the forces of race and
northern oppression, and the people of the South rallied
around it.
The Populists realized that if their party was to succeed
against the political power of the Northeast, which would have
to be done if they hoped to carry out the aims of their platform, they would have to form some sort of political association which would give them sufficient strength to carry the
South as well as the West.

The Farmers' Alliance.had already

acquired political control of nearly all the Southern states,
by working within the Democratic organization,16 and the
Populists hoped that the Alliance men would swing over to their
party.

The fact that they did not meant not only the failure

of the Southern Alliance, but the defeat of the new

15This

animosity goes back to Reconstruction, when the
Negroes were settled on the richest lands, and the "poor
whites" shuttled to the less productive hill counties of
the South. Shannon,~. cit., p. 408.

l~icks, ~. cit., p. 239.
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party, which became identified with the groups which the
Southerner hated and feared. 17
When the Democratic convention failed to placate the
Alliance forces by rejecting their major demands, the movement
was strong in the, South' for action against the Chicago nominee.
However, the only way, the Southerners felt, to vote against
Cleveland, would be to vote for Harrison, and this they refused to do.

The compromise which they worked out was typi-

fied by "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman of South Carolina, who, after
ousting the Bourbon politioians from the Democratic party in
that state beoame the spokeaman for the dissatisfied "wool
hat" farmers of the uplands (the very groups that the Populists
looked to for support).

Tillman declared it would be "simply

infamous" for any true Democrat

in South Carolina to vote for

a Populist .andidate, for this would only increase the ohanoes
for the election of a Republican; but he did let it be known
that he favored many of the Populist beliefs, such as free
silver, a national income tax, senatorial elections, and other
planks of the Omaha platform. 18
Thus, in many parts of the South, the Democrats "stole
the thunder" from the Populists. who were left with no issues
and few supporters.

And while General Field, who as a Vir-

ginian and an ex-Confederate officer, had respect if not support in the South, many of the imported campaigners, such as

_.

17 Ibid

l~ancis B. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman. South
Carolinian, p. 311.
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General Weaver and Mrs. Lease, fared much worse, their audiences showing their appreciation of the oratorical efforts
of the Populists' campaigners by rewarding the speakers with
rotten eggs ,and other tokens. 19
There were,

howeve~,

a few instances of fusion in the

South between Populists and Republicans which proved successful.

In Alabama and Arkansas the two parties placed fusion

tickets in the field for state candidates in 1892, and with
their combined strength gave the Democrats greater competition than they had experienced in many years.

And while the

fusion efforts in these states was not victorious, it did
demonstrate that co-operation between the two parties was
possible. 20 A similar situation existed in Louisiana, where
the two groups reached an agreement. 21 The fusion groups
were most successful in the upland areas of these states,
where the population was predominantly white, and where most
of the people were small_ farmers.

In the "black belts" of

the South, where theTe were large concentrations of Negroes,
the traditional Democratic strength remained.
The success of the fusion groups, while very limited,
brought the prOblem of the Negro voter into the center of
attention, and instead of being merely a political nonentity,
the Negro found himself, in many parts of the South, suddenly
19Barr , ~. ~., p. 1170.
20
Buck, .2E,. ~., p. 149.
21Kelvin J. White, "Populism in Loullliana During the
Nineties," ~. y. ~. ~., V (June, 1918), 11.
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on the center of the political stage.

One of the main results

of the fusion efforts in the South was to place the fusionists
in the position of courting the Negro vote. 22 That most of
the Negro vote went to the Democrats

~as

due in part to the

effort by Republicans in the House of Representatives to pass,
in 1888, a bill which would have guaranteed adequate protection
to the Negro voter of the South, even i f federal supervisi~n
and the exercise of military power were necessary.23

With this

threat hanging over them, Democratic leaders in the "black
belt" oounties made sure their colored constituents voted
"right" by providing them with plenty of liquid refreshment
and all-night entertainment on election eve, and marched them
to the polla the next morning with explicit instructions. 24
The Democrats won handily in these are.s.
The results of fusion were apparent when the votes were
counted in November.

Weaver, with a total vote of 1,041,000,

had carried the states of Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada and
North Dakota, and had received large percentages of the popular vote in Wyoming, Alabama, South Dakota and Nebraaka. 25
But while Weaver had reoeived nearly nineteen per cent as
many votes. as were given to Cleveland, and had actually
polled well over a million votes, the figures are not entirely
22 Ibid ., p. 12.

23 Hioks,

~. ~.,

24Ibid.,

p. 253.

25~pleton's Annual

Figure

•

p. 252.
Cyolopedia, 1892, p. 755.
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accurate, for his votes included large numbers of Demooratio
votes in the West and no small number of RepUblican votes in
the South.

In the states of Colorado, IdahO, Kaneas, North

Dakota, and Wyoming, where Weaver ran'strongly, there were no
26
Demooratio eleotors in the field to cut into his plurality.
In spite of efforts of their opponents to disoredit
their showing, however, the faot remained that the Populist
candidate had polled more than a million vote., had twentytwo elec toral vote., and the People I s Party was the f irat
third-party organization to make an appearanoe in the electoral college since the Civil War. 27
The Populist. were jUbilantJ

A typical reaotion oomes

from a pioneer Kansan, a veteran of many a fight in the
Allianoe and for the Populist oause.

He wrote in his diary

for Tuesday, November 8, 1892: "Bleotion day--P. P. Elected
entire/county tioket....
Bluer than thunder....

Everything enoouraging.
Cleviand

Thank God the repubs are down."28

(si~J

Repuba

elected President.

He further desoribes the

celebration staged to mark the viotory of the 'PoPulist. in one
Kansas county, with an entry for Monday, November

14,

as fol-

lows: "Great Big Jollifioation among the demoorats &: People's
party.

An immense orowd of people, toroh light &: transparen-

J.

oies of all Kind and all d1soreptions [sio

Of course the

26Jos~ah Quincy, "Issues and Prospeots in the Campaign,"
North Amerioan Review, CLXIII (August, 1896), 18.5.
27Hioks, £2. ~., p. 267.
28pOW8l1 Moore (editor), "A Hoosier in Kansas, the Diary
of Hiram H. Young, 1886-189.5, Pioneer of Cloud County," Kansas
Historioal Quarterly, XIV (1946), 441.
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repubs were Mad."29
While the Populists, like Hiram Young, were celebrating
their victory and looking forward to further triumphs, others
were already observing signs of weakQes8 in the Populi8t
structure.

The Populist victory had been more pronounced in

Kansas than in any other state, but even there were signs
that all was not as it should have been.

The western Kan8as

counties, for example, where many felt the Populist8 were
strong, turned in Republican majorities, while the Populists
showed their main strength in the more urban areas in the
Eastern part of the state. 30

While it was true that the

Populist-Democratic coalition had captured the state executive offices, the state senate, and four out of seven congressional seats, the Republicans had a slight majority in
the lower house of the legislature.

While the coalition

ticket had polled fifty-two per cent of the vote of the
state, it was comprised of both Democratic and Populist
strength, which, in the election of 1890, had been divided,
with the Populists polling thirty-six per cent and the Democrats securing twenty-four per cent of the votes cast, or a
total of sixty per cent of the vote in 1890. 31

Accordingly,

then, it would seem that the victor7 in 1892 actually reaulted in a lo.s of approximately eight per cent of the

_.

29 Ibid

30John M. Stahl, "Are the Farmers Populistst," North
American Review, CLXIII (September, 1896), 273-274. Stahl
was secretary of the Farmers National Congress in the
United States.
3lRa7Mond C. Miller, "The Background of Populi8lll in
Kanaas," ~. y. ~. ~., XI (March, 192$), 481.
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strength of the coalition from the votes polled two years
previously.

Republicans in the state claimed that it was

only because of "mongrel fusion" that the victory was won,
and "without the aid of democratic votes there would not have
been a single populist 'congressman or presidential elector
or state officer elected and there would scarcely have been a
baker's dosen members of the legislature entitled to their
seats. n32
The fact remained, however, that the Populists had won
in many contests, with the aid of.their allies, and by doing
so had badly hurt the Republican party.

This was great com-

pensation for the Populists, who viewed the G. O. P. as the
organization principally accountable for the difficulties
from which they suffered. 33

It was in the far West, particu-

larly, where the Populists had succeeded in encroaching upon
traditional Republican strongholds, with Colorado, Nevada
and Idaho lost, and Wyoming barely preserved in the Republican column, by a majority of 8.454 votes to 7,722. 34
In the East, where Populism had never been

~trong,

the

Populist vote was nil, with such states as Ohio giving
Weaver less than fifteen

tho~and

votes out of a total of

nearly one million votes cast in the state. 35

Here Populism

32Topeka Daily Capitol, December 30, 1892, in PO~ulist
CIIppI~s, Volume I, Kansas state Historical Soc ety
ectIon, opeka.
33Buck, ~. cit., p. 153.

parrY

co

34Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, 1892, p. 755.
35 Ibid

_.
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had little strength, for silver was no issue, the farmers were
not discontented, and the wage workers, who could see nothing
in Populism to improve their lot, were oontent to vote in their
traditional pattern.

In Weaver's hame state, Iowa (with Mis-

souri, the least "western" of the trans-Mississippi states),
the Populists polled less than five per cent of the total
vote, with the General getting a little more than twenty
thousand votes out of a total of more than four hundred
thousand. 36
Following the election, the Populist. set about to consolidate their gains, and plan their strategy for the oftyear election of

~894,

when they hoped to gain additional

strength in the Congress, stabilize their control of state
legislature., and prepare for the presidential battle in 1896.
strong in their victories, and reta1n1ng the platform of 1892,
complete with its tree-silver plank whioh had served them so
well in the far West, they hoped for greater triumph••
The consolidation of their victories, however, proved a
rather challenging task, and in several cases they did a
rather sorry job.

In Kanaas, for example, after a ludicrous

battle between Populists and Republioana tor control of the
House of Representatives, which at one time led to the existence of two separate bodies,31 the Populist Administration ot
Governor Llewelling found itself in considerable difficulty,

36~.
31See Edwin.J. Walbourn, Jr., "Rump Legislature of
Kansas, 1893, an Evaluation" (unpublished Master's thesis,
K. S. T. C., Pittsburg, 19$0), tor a thorough discussion of
this.
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being beset by irregularities in the administration of the
government, and torn by internal strife. 38 In Nebraska,
where the Populists were able to elect the able Willbm V.
Allen to the Senate, they soon got involved in a quarrel with
the state supreme oourt over attempted impeachment proceedings of Republican state officers.

The result of this flare-

up was that a judicial election went to the Republicans beoause the Democrats and Populists failed to agree on a fusion
candidate, and the Populiats held the Democrats, their eratwhile allies, responaible. 39
Because of these and other d1tficulties arising between
the Populists and Democrats, a movement began to take shape
among members of the People's Party for a dropping of the
fusion efforts, and the keeping of a "middle-of-the-road"
course by the party in the election campaign of 1894.

Instead

of attempting to win votea by fusing with other parties, many
of the Populists became more resolved upon the courae of gaining converts individually to Populist beliefa, which would
give additional strength to the party and

el1m1na~e

the neces-

sity of working out unhappy "deals" after the election waa over.
But it was the very fact that fusion had led to success in 1892
which led many of the older party members to oppose this
middle-of-the-road movement, and blinded them to the weaknesses
in the results of the 1892 election. 40

3 8Barr, 1££.
39Hicka, 2£.

40Buck, 2£.

£!1.,
£!1.,

pp. 1188-1193, for discusaion of this.
pp. 285-286.

cit., p. 153.
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The party continued to gain strength and support during
the years 1893 and 1894, however, in spite of the difficult
times which were besetting man,. Populiat office-holders, and
in spite of the fact that the Populist movement in general
was viewed in some sections, particularly the East, as some
form of "advanced socialism," which would plunge the nation
into a "cheap money debauch."4 l
In a move designed to increase their power among industrial workers of the Northeast, the Populist convention in
Illinois in 1894 voted to endorse the political program of
the American Federation of Labor in that state, with the
significant exception of a plank in the Labor platform dealing with collective ownership of the means of production and
distribution. 42

With this move, the Populists hoped to

enter an area which heretofore had been barred to them, and
perhaps, -with an alliance of workers, break the hold which
the older parties had in this section.
By the summer of 1894, the II1ddle-of-the-road movement
was bearing fruit, and in many states, where fu"siQn had been
the rule in 1892, it was abandoned in favor of straight Populist nominations.

While Weaver and other leaders warned that

chances for victory would be greater with fusion tickets,
many states abandoned the policy, and, impressed with apparent
41 "The Populists in Congress," Review of Reviews, X
(JUly, 1894), 1.
42Chester MeA. Destler "Consumation of a Labor-Populist
Alliance in Illinois, 1894,' M. v. g. R., XXVII (March, 1941),
591.
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~opul18t strength, decided to try for viotory alone. 43

In

Kansas the middle-of-the-road Populists had gained strength
suffioient to give them oontrol of the state party organization, and the Democrats, 'disgusted with the exoesses of the
Llewelling administration, ret'used to t'use, even though it
would possibly mean the returning to offioe of the Republioans.
This upset many fusion Populists, and Hiram Young wrote, di8gu8tedly, on September 29, 1894, "Demooratio Convention.
Placed full ticket in tile field except for oounty Superintendent ••• I will remember those Demoorats in the future."44
But in the South fusion grew apace, and the few unions
of Populi8ts and Republicans continued to gain strength.

With

the Democrat8 the target of Yote-fraud accusations, the two
parties united in an attempt to secure more hone8t election8
in the South.

The ooalition parties still attempted to woo

the Negro vote, a8 well as appeal to the white residents of
the highland areas. 45

In Missouri and other states, whioh

heretofore had been relatively weak Populist areas, the
Alliance movement beoame completely politioal, ilnd nearly all
the members of that organization identified themselves with
the Populiat cause. 46

In North Carolina, where Republioanism

43Hieks, £e. oit., pp. 326-327. Weaver aooepted both
Populist and Democratic nomination8 for Congress from Iowa in
1894.
44Moore, ~. cit., XV (1947), pp. 176-177.
45white, loc. ~., p. 12; Hick8, £e. ~., p. 329.
46aomer Clevenger, "The Farmers' Alliance in Missouri."
Miaaouri Historioal Review, XXXIX (OCtober, 1944), 44.

was strong, a union was effected which was to be espeoially
important since two senatorial vaoancies were to be filled by
the legislature which would be elected that year. 47
With fusion still in effeot in many areas, but with it
faltering, or very shakY in others, the Populists went to the
polls in confidence that they would again triumph, hoping to
secure for themselves a viotory even greater than they had
won in the election two years earlier.
The story of the election was succinctly told by Hiram
wrote on the election day: "Fine
48
The one bright
Complete viotory for the repubs."

Young, the diarist, who
day.

spot for him was the fact that while the entire state Populist ticket lost, there was one winner on the county Populist
slate, the People's Party candidate for Probate Judge, who
won by a majority of twenty votes.

This was Young himselt. 49

In Kansas, where the anti-fusion foroes, coupled with the
irregularities of the Populist administration, led to the
abandonment of fusion, the People's Party polled thirty-nine
per cent of the total vote, while the Republicans,obtained
forty-nine per cent, and on the strength of this plurality
were returned to office. 50
In Iowa, where there were a total of five fusion congressional districts, the Populists scored same gains,
47HiCks, ~. cit., pp. 330-331.
4~oore, loco cit., XV (1947), 180.
49 Ibid •
50Miller, loco cit., p. 481.
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although even General Weaver went down to defeat in t he general
Republican victory.51 Throughout the Wee t, the Republic ans
regained the territory lost in 1892, with Colorado and Idaho
both safely back in the G. O. P. column; and in Nevada the
Silver party, whioh refused to fuse with the Populists, was
the victor. 52
In the South, the Populists were able to compensate to
some degree for this loss with a clear fusion victory in
North Carolina.

Polling 148,000 votes,53 or nearly fifty-

four per cent of the vote in the state,54

the fusion forces

won in the state anq judicial races, the Populists alone won
control of the state senate, and the Populists and Repub1icans together gained control of the state House of Representatives.

Thus, by controlling the legislature, the fusionists

were able to name a Republican to fill an unexpired Senate
seat, and a Populist, Marion Butler, was elected for the sixyear term in the Senate. 55
In Arkansas the Populists soored 24,000 votes, more than
doubling their 1892 showing, while in Georgia

~he

result was

51Herman Clarence Nixon, "The Populist Movement in Iowa,"
Iowa Journal of History and Politics, XXIV (January, 1926),

76.

5 2 Hioks, ,22. cit., p. 333.
53Quincy, loco ill., p. 186.
54Hicks, ,22. ~., p. 337.
55Ibid., pp. 335-336.
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equally impressive, with the 1894 total of 96,000 votes, a
considerable gain over the 42,000 registered in 1892. 56
Texas, Virginia, Alabama and Missouri also showed considerable
advances in Populist strength, with resultant gains in congressional seats.

As a who1e. the Populists. while they had fewer

victories to show for it, had gained ground over 1892, polling
a total of 1,471,590 votes, an increase over the preceding
election of forty-two per ceBt. 57
It was the Republicans' turn, however, to be jubilant!
They had regained control of the national House of Representatives, and had defeated the Populist threat where it had hurt
them the most, while allying with the same group in the South
and showing a profit thereby.

This ananalous situation had

givlpn them victory, and had enabled them to beat the Populists
at their own game, using fusion to effect
in doubtful areas.

po~tical

triumphs

True, they had lost Nebraska, where fusion

had, after a fashion been effected at the state level, but
they had won back the states of Kansas, Colorado and Idaho. 58
In Kanaas, where the Republican victory was yiewed rather
like the awakening from a nightmare, the victors celebrated
their reconquest of the state by a huge demonstration in
Topeka, advertised as the "celebrated Populist funeral
parade."

On the program they obligingly included an obituary

of their defeated rivals:

56Quincy, loco cit., p. 186.
57Hicks, ~. cit., p. 338.

58See Figure 2.
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,

Died, on Tuesday, November 6, 1894, of
appendicitis, Populillm, only son of Hr. and
'Mrs. Calamity Wail, aged five years and two
months •••• ~ Every loyal Republican will
officiate.;;>9
Tney were almost rignt, for wnile tne People's Party nad

not died following tne election of 1894, it was very sick
indeed.

In spite of gaining in total votes, especially in tne

Soutn, tne Populists nad been beaten, for in tne states of
tneir original strengtn, tney nad lost, not gained.

Atter

1894 tnere were no "Populist" states left, all were eitner
controlled by tne old parties or, in tne case of North Carolina and Nebraska, by coalition governments.

Wnile tne fusion

victories of 1892 nad seemed impressive, witnout their allies
tne Populists were reduced once again to an impoverisned
tnird-party status.
Tne Populists nad, however, been able to contribute
several construotive meaaures to tne various states wherein
they had neld power.

In Kansas they nad succeeded in offi-

oially ending the cancerous seotional strife wnicn had rent
that state for forty years by electing an

ex-Conf~derate

to

office, and in enacting oreditable reforms; and in Nebraska
tne Populist legislature had enacted an Australian ballot
law, a maximum freight-rate bill, and aocomplished the feat
of electing an "honest man", William V. Allen, to the Senate. 60

59Fram the collection of Populist Party Pamphlets of the
Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka.
6°Traoy , loco cit., p. 241.
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On the national scene, the amall group of Populist congresamen and senators, maintaining a power position as a bloc,
became nationally-recognized for their "industry and attention
to business;" and were commended for ·accomplishing "far more
than might have been expected, with the odds of numbers so
61
overwhe1m1ngly against •••• " them.
While the accomplishments of the party were important,
the task which now lay before it was even more so, for the

1894 election had destroyed one Populist hope, that of gaining strength from the Northeast, which had thoroughly repudiated Populism, and the Far West, which had proved disappointing.

Even before the election it was doubted it the Populists

would even be able to form a national organization, and it
was pointed out that the Populist movement was already beginning to have an important effect on national politics by the

virtue of the adoption, by the Democratic party, of many
Populist proposals.

The Populists were described as a "leaven-

ing ingredient," which was working on the political thinking
of the Democrats.

By 1894 the Democratic party had officially

adopted an incane tax plank as a part of their congressional
platform, an event which, according to one editorial, lifted
the Populist party, which had suggested this in 1892, "to a
position of dignity and prestige that had not previously been
accorded it."62

This move by the Democrats, according to the

61"The Populists in Congress," Review of Reviews, X
(July, 1894), 7.
-62"Populism as a Leaven," Review of Reviews, X (July,

1894), 7-8.

--
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editorial, "may justly be called a mighty manife.tation of
the working of the Populist leaven."63
Another eX8JllP1e of this was the change of heart on the
part' of the Democrats on their 1892 plank calling for the
repeal of a law levying a ten per cent tax on IItate bank notes,
which in eSllence demanded "the re-establillhment of paper money
The Populist II the
issued under authority of state laws. n64
lIame year had demanded a strictly national currency.65

In

1894, the Democratll, who held a IIweeping majority of the
Congress with which to pass into law their proposed change,
"deliberately voted down the proposition to repeal the statebank tax."66

While it was pointed out that both the Republi-

cans and Populists opposed the repeal of the measure, it was.
concluded that in the course of aotion to be pursued as a
result of the defeat of the repeal bill, "it seema likely
that the Populist leaven is destined to work more effectively
upon the Democratic majority •••• "67
But while the Democrats were busily adopting Populist
planks for their own platform, the Populists were, equally
busy, in the years following their July convention in 1892,

8.

63Ibid.
64"Another Instance,n Review of Reviews, X (July, 1894),
658ee Appendix II.
66nAnother Instance," ~. cit., p. 8.

67~.
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abandoning them.

Pointing out that the Populists were rapid-

ly moving in the direction ot "conservatimn and sanity." one
observer pointed out the "remarkable speed with which it
the Populist party
Th~

is deserting its tormer tenets ••• "68

reason1or this was the influence, in the West especially,

of newcomers to the party told, Democrats who supported the
free-silver issue and who telt they had been "betrayed by
69
their party and their executive." With the influx ot these
people into the party in the West. the Populists were yielding more and more to the temptation to abandon their other
issues, concentrate on the silver question, and hope to wean
enough Democrats away trom their party to win in 1896.

The

1892 Democratic platform had supported the gold standard as
against tree silver, and Cleveland. the Democratic president.
was known to tavor this stand; it seemed. therefore, sate to
the Populists to continue their support ot the silver issue,
which was bringing new converts to the told. in hopes that
the other parties would continue with the money planks ot
their 1892 platform.
As it would happen, by the end ot 1894, the Democrats
were beginning a program of adoption ot Populis t ideas and
planks, and the Populists, in turn, were embarking on a program to woo Democrats who were dissatisfied with the planks

ot the 1892 platform which dealt with money.

The Populists

were risking all tor 1896 on a gamble, that the Democrat.

6~racy. loco cit., p. 248.
69 Ibid •

--
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wouJ.d support the same financial program which they supported
in 1892, and that Populism, then, couJ.d gather into its ranks
hordes of discontented Democrats and western Silverites, who
wouJ.d ohange parties rather than prinoiples.

The Populists

were going to gamble; the stakes were to be silver: the odds
wouJ.d be unknown.

CHAPTER III
THE SILVER QUESTIO)f ALTERS POPULISM

Early in the career of the Populilt party it wal d1acovered by leaders of the movement that of all the issues of
the Omaha platform the one with the largest appeal to the
electorate was that of the free coinage of silver.

In the

1892 election this was the one factor which brought into the
Populist camp many grOUPI which had no other reason for
all¥ibg

themselves with the party.

Beoause, in 1892, both

of the other parties had supported the gold standard, II18llY
perlons, particularly in the far Welt, flocked to the Populist banner, for no other reason than the Populi.ts had
pledged to do for silver what neither of the old parties had
dared. l
The silver issue was baaed on the demand by the Populilts
that lilver bullion be coined at a ratio of sixteen ounces of
silver to one ounce of gold, and that no limitation be placed
on silver coinage. 2 This demand can be traced back to the
Ocala demands of the Farmer's Alliance, which advooated
approximately the lame plank in their refor. platform of 1892. 3
The real cau.e. of the difficulty, however, go back more than
twenty years, to 1873, when a bill, known as the Coinage Act,
1

Hicks, ~. ~., p. 301.
2See Appendix II.
3See Appendix I.

$1
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was passed eliminating the standard silver dollar as an American coin.
The reason for this action was that the silver dollar had
practically disappeared trom the American scene.

It had sel-

dom been seen in circulation since a law. sponsored by President Andrew Jackson in 1834. had established the sixteen to
one coinage ratio. 4

Because the market value of silver was

greater than this established ratio, it made the silver dollar
actually worth slightly more than one dollar and drove it out
of circulation. into the hands of persons who hoarded it for
its silver content. 5

It was possible to grow to manhood,

before the civil war, according to Professor Paxson, without
ever seeing a silver dollar of American coinage. 6
In February, 1873, when congress passed the law demonetizing silver, no coins had been in circulation for a dozen
years and silver dollars had been practically out of circulation since 1834.

The price of silver at that time was still

above "1.2929 per ounce, at which commercial rate it would
have been equal to gold, so it remained the deare~ metal. 7
Since the silver dollar was not economically Justifiable, and
since the American pUblic was not accustomed to using that
particular coin, the Congress felt that it should not be included on the coinage list as prescribed by law.
4prederick L. Paxson, Recent History of the United States,
p. 35.
5Buck, £2. £!i., p. 156.
6Paxson, £2. £!i., p. 36.

7~.
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The law, in effeot, merely dropped the standard silver
dollar from the list of ooins whioh would be manufaotured trom
bullion presented to the mint. 8

The silver dollars then in

oirculation were not demonetized, but' their ciroulatory value
was 11Jll1ted. 9
Almost immediately upon the passage of this law, however,
the prioe ot 8ilver dropped sharply, changing the value ot the
two dollars and causing widespread 10s8es throughout the silver industry.

This price decline was caused by the great sil-

ver strikes in the C<:Dstock lode in Nevada, which inoreased
produotion of domestio silver tremendously; the lessened cost

ot silver production due to opening of the western railroads;
and increased etticienoy in the mines due to new processes for
extracting silver trom low grade and retactory ores. 10 This
increased production, ooupled with the limitation placed on
the buying of silver bullion by the Coinage Act of 1873,
oaused values to drop preoipitously.
With the drop in the value ot silver, the ratio ot silver
in relation to gold began to ohange, and by 1874 the ratio

etood at 16.17 to 1, followed by continued depreciations during the years iDDediately tollowing.ll

With this drastic

change in the relative values ot the two, _tals, and the
Baenry Steele Commager (editor), Documents in American
History, II, 75-76.

9Buck , ~. ~., p. 1$6.
10Paxson, ~.-2.ll., p. 37.
llw. H. Harvey, Coin's Finanoial Sohool, p.

34.
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placing of the gold dollar as the basic monetary unit, a movement began which, same politicians contended, "S0 decreased
the world's supply of st~dard money [meaning Silver] as to
bring about a shrinkage of values that covered a period of
more than twenty yeara. n12
With the stepped-up production of domestic silver, immediate pressure was placed upon the Congr.aa for the resumption of the coinage of silver dollars, to turniah a market
for the extended si1ver production of the country.

Senators

and representatives from the western states were especially
vocal in their demands for a resumption of silver coinage,
which they felt would place more money in circulation and
help to alleviate the effects of a depression which had been
depreaaing the nation for several years, following the collapse of the great Cooke financial empire in 1873 and the
stock market panic which occurred in that year. 13
A bill was introduced into the House of Representatives
in 1877 by Repreaentative Richard P. Bland of Missouri which
would allow for the resumption of coinage of silver at the
old ratio, with no limitation on the amount.

Under the

leadership of Senator Alliaon of Iowa,14 the bill was altered
by the upper house to provide for a minimum of two million
dOllars worth of silver dollars to be coined each month. 1S
l2Wl1liam Jennings and Mary Baird Bryan,

.2! Wl111am Jennings Bryan, p. 113.
l3 See above, p. 4.
14see above, p. 7.

l5Cammager, £2. ~., pp. 97-98.

~
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The

bil~,

which in tll1s tOl'll1 was approved by both the

Senate and the House ot Representatives, was vetoed by President Hayes, who asserted that:
••• the silver dollar authorized by this bill
is worth 8 to 9 per cent less than it purports
to be worth, and is made a legal tender tor
debts contracted when the law did not recognize such coins as lawf~ money.l 6
Tll1s, ot course, was precisely what the advocates ot the
bil~

wanted, and why they included in the measure the provis-

ion lII8king silver legal tender in payment ot contractual
debts "except wllere otherwise
contract."

express~y

stipulated in the

It was the hope ot supporters ot the bill that,

by making money, especially silver money, more plentiful,
their constituents in the debt-ridden areas ot

~he

West

be able to solve their economic problems more easily.

wo~d

The

measure was passed over the presidentls veto on February 28,
1878, by a "sweeping bi-partizan majority."17
In that same year the ratio between silver and gold fell
to a record low point ot 17.94 to

~;

and the next year, 1879,

the ratio reached a low ot 18.40 to 1.18

By

~885'the ratio

between the two matals had tallen to 19.41 to ~, 19 and the
situation became desperate; tor tar tram

a~leviating

the con-

ditions which it was designed to correct, the Bland-Allison
Act was merely intensifying them, for the below-par
16Ibid., pp. 98-99.
17Paxson, ~. ~., p. 40.
18HarVey, ~. ~., p. 34.
19Ibid.

do~~ars
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which were be1Dg coined under the provisions of the act, two
million dollara worth each month, were not being accepted by
the pUblic.

The situation became ao intolerable that Preai-

dent Cleveland, in 1885, 'was forced to ask Congress to repeal
the _aaure, wtUch he did in his firat annual measage to that
group, delivered December 8, 1885. 20
Pointing out that since February, 1878, the Secretary of
the Treasury had b.en purahasing and coining ailver bullion
to the value of $2,000,000 each month (the minimum allowable
under the Bland-Alliaon Act), which made a total ot
215,759,431 ailver dollara, the Preaident atreased that only
about 50,000,000 such dollara had actually gone into circulation, leaving more than 165,000,000 of theceina to be
stored by the gover11lllent, which entailed a considerabh expense for the construction of vaults and storage facilities.
"Eve17 month," he concluded, "two millions ot gold in the
public treaaury are paid out tor two millions or mare ot
Silver dollara, to be added to the idle mass already aocumulated.,,2l

Instead ot making more money available, the act

was inde.d making money even "tighter·, for not only was the
ailver not being accepted by the public, but gold which
otherwise would have been in oirculation was be1Dg drained
trOlll the treaaUI7 to pay tor the ailver bullion.
value of the silver dollar at that
20Cammager, £2.
21Ibid.

~.,

p. 118.

22P&Xson, £2. cit., p. 104.

The actual

22
time was eighty-five cents.
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By 1889 the ratio had dropped to 22.09 to 1,

23

and still

no action wae taken on Cleveland's suggestion, beyond debate
in the Congress, but in the following year a bill was introduoed for the repeal of the Bland-All"ison Act, and the inauguration of a new plan, which, it waa hoped, would curb the
exce.se. of the old bill and accomplish what the silverites
had hoped to aooomplish with the Bland-Allison bill, namely
give to the

CO\lI1try

a silver cUl'rency which was on a par with

gold, and still conauae the domestic silver produotion.
The bill, called the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890,
was de.igned to oorrect the basic evils of the Bland-Allison
bill, namely the draining off from the treasury of gold to
pay for silver bullion, and the coining of sub-par-value
silver coins.
The proposed bill direoted the Secretary of the TreasUl'y
to bUy silver bullion and to pay f or it with treasUl'y notes,
rather than gold.

The bill stipulated that no more than

4,500,000 ounces of bullion oould be pUl'ohaaed, and the prioe
would be the market value thereof, not a standard. set by the
act, thereby taking advantage of the falling price of the
meta1. 24
This bill, supporters boasted, would "utilize every
ounce of the silver produce of the country and more--utilize
it for money and turn it into the channels of trade and
avenues of business," and c1amed that as a result of the

23Harvey,

.2E,.

24Commeger,

ill., p.

~.

~.

oit •• p. 137.
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passage of the bill "silver is nearer parity with gold today
than it has been for the last fifteen or eighteen years."25
True. the ratio of the two metals rose in the year the bill
passed. moving up to 19.75 to 1. but
temporary condition. 26 .

~his

was to be but a

While opponents of the measure claimed that it was
passed "mainly as a party necessity to appease the silver
producing states for their support in the Senate and at the
POlls,"27 its supporters insisted that the bill, "whatever
its defects, leaves the currency which it enlarges on a
safer basis than it was under the old law. and which maintains the two metals and the paper currency at an equal value
in circulation."28
In spite of these hopes, however. the value of silver in
relation to gold again began to fall. reaching a ratio of
20.92 to 1 in 1891. and by 1892 dropping to the record low of
23.72 to 1. 29
With the rise of silver dollars being coined
in the country. the amount of gold coin began to drop. falling fram

596,386.272 on November 1. 1891. to $569.633.412
on Decamber 31. 1892. 30 .

25william McKinley. Jr •• "What Congress Has Done." North
American Review, CLI (November. 1890). 516.
26
Harvey. ££. £!!•• p. 34.
27William McAdoo "What Congress Has Done." North
American Review. CLI {November. 1890). 528.

2~enry Cabot Lodge. "What Congress Haa Done." North
American Review. CLI (November. 1890). 518.
29Harvey. ££. cit., p. 34.
30Appleton l s Annual Cyclopedia, 1892, p. 757.
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In the eleotion of 1892, Weaver, the free-silver oandidate of the Populists, was showing great strength in the
states of the West, but the very Western farmers and miners
who demanded free silver by their votes for the Populists were
not anxious to use the silver money already on hand.

By the

time of Cleveland's seoond inauguration in 1893, the silver
dollar as produced by the United States mints was worth
sixty-five oents in gold. 3l
Clearly this situation oould not last, and by 1893 the
movement was strong for .2'epeal of the Sherman aot, with
President Cleveland leading the fight.

Most of the Republi-

oans in the Congress, who were in the minority, sided with
the president in the disputes. 32 and, allying themselves with
the "gold Democrats," were able "to bring the issue of repeal
to a vote on November 1, 1893, at whioh time an aot was passed
oalling for repeal of the Sherman law. 33
The passage of the repeal measure marks the peak of Populist strength, in many respeots; for it was on the vote of
approval of this proposal that the traditional party lines
were broken, for many of the Southern and Western Demoorats
broke with the administration faotion of their party on the
issue. 34 Vociferous attacks on the administration were made
by Democrats, led by William Jennings Bryan, a oongressman
31Paxson, . .2£. ill., p. 184.
3 2 Ibid., p. 192.
aot.

33Ccmmager, .2£. oit., p. 149 oontains the text of this
34Paxson, .2£. ~., p. 205.
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f'rom Nebraska, who called the repeal movement the dburial of'
silver. with no promise of resurrection. d35

Bryan attacked

the gold standard and the gold dollar as dthat child of'
ignorance and avarice. d and called it dthe most dishonest dollar which we could employ.d3 6
Both Silver Democrats and Silver Republicans attacked the
President and his supporters for destroying their pet arguments
by showing that the attempt by the United States alone to bolster the price of silver had resulted in a fall. rather than a
rise. in its price.

During the period f'ram 1891 to 1895 the

commercial ratio of the two metals averaged 27 to 1. 37
The supporters of' repeal did not intend further to depreciate silver; indeed. many agreed with Senator Sherman, the
author of the bill of' 1890. who justified his vote for repeal
by saying:

"11' I had the power to regulate the market I

would gladly- advance it [ailverJ to par with gold at the
legal ratio."3 8 Sherman assured the Senate that he would
support any measure dthat will tend to maintain the parity
of' the two metals at same f'ixed ratio approaching their
commercial value. d39
While'conservative Republicans like Senator Lodge were
blaming dthe utter indif'f'erence of the Administration to
35Quoted in Marion M. Miller (editor). Great Debates in
American History. XlV. 318.

36~.
37Jeannette Paddock Nichols, "The Politics and Personalities of' Silver Repeal in the United States Senate. d American
Historical Review. XLI (OCtober. 1935). 28. footnote 7.
38M1ller. ££. cit •• p. 401.
39~.
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the currency question and the complete failure of the Demoorats, from the President down, to make the slightest effort
towards its solution,"40 supporters of free silver were
equa11y adament in their viewpoint, and they echoed t he views

ot their constituents.

Jerry Simpson, of Kansas, for example,

explained the typioa1 Populilt approach to the problem in a
speech on the tloor of the House of Representatives.

"I

received," Simplon said, "a letter fram a friend of mine today
that expresses my sentiment I exactly.

He says: 'Jerry, you

stand by 16 to 1 until hell freezes over, and we will send
you a pair of skates to came hame on. ,1141
Obduracy, then, was the cb.1ef characteristic of both
sides in the dispute during and atter the repeal of the
Sherman Act.

Both oonvinoed of the correctness of their

views, both expre8lling the opinions ot great groups or the
Americ an public, nei ther group was willing to change r ram the
position in whioh it round itself.

The Republioans were

standing mCll'e solidly than the Demoorats, but both parties
were split on the issue.
Indioative of the reeling of same Democrats toward the
Administration's stand on the silver question was that of
William Jennings Bryan, who, in a speeoh at the Democratic
State Convention at Lincoln, Nebraska, October 4, 1893,
4 0Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Results ot Democratic Victory,"
North American Review, CLIX (September, 1894), 274.
41Miller, ~. £!i., pp. 341-342.
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declared that if the Democratic party of Nebraska supported
the gold standard: "I promise you that I will go out and
serve my country and my God under some other name, even if
I must go alone."4 2
By'June, 1894, 'the silver sentiment in
Nebraska, led by Bryan,' had grown strong enough that a group
of Democrats were able to meet in Omaha and organize the silver Democrats of that state into an active political organization.

In September of that year they were able to get the

approval of the state party convention for a plank declaring:
"we favor the immediate restoration of the free and unlimited
coinage of gold and silver at the present ratio of 16 to 1,
without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation
on earth. _43
Early the following year a conference was held in Salt
Lake City, at which time was formed an organization known
as the National Bimetallic Union, with headquarters to be
at Chicago, and a weekly newspaper, called the Bimetallist,
was established to spread the views of the silver faction. 44
On March 5, 1895, silver supporters in Congress, headed
by Bryan and Bland, issued an address outlining the views
of the silverites, a move which Bryan himself called, "the
beginning of t he successful efforts upon the part of the
42william Jennings Bryan, The First Battle, pp. 123-124,
contains the full text of this speech.
43Ibid., pp. 150-151, f or the text of this plank.

44~., p. 155.
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silver Democrats of the nation to take control of the Democratic organization."45

Their views were as follows:

We believe that the establishment of gold
as the only monetary standard and the elimination of silver as a full legal tender money,
will increase the purchasing power of each dollar, add to the bUrden of all debts, decrease
the market value of all other forms of property, continue and intensify business depression,
and, finally, reduce the majority of the people
to financial bondage.
We believe that no party can hope for enduring success in the United States so long as
it advocates a single gold standard, and that
the advocacy of such a financial policy would
be especially fatal to a party which, like the
Democratic party, derives its voting strength
from those who may without reproach be called
the common people; and we point to the overwhelming defeat of the party of 1894, to the
opposition aroused by the veto of the
seigniorage bill and to the still more unanimous protest against the issue of gold bonds,
as proof that the Democratic party cannot be
brought to the support of the gold standard
policy.
We believe that the money queption will
be the paramount issue in 1896 •••• 4 6
This pronouncement on the part of the silver supporters
within his party was answered by President Cleveland, who,
on April 13, 1895, wrote a letter declining an invitation to
speak at a meeting in Chicago of supporters of the gold
standard policy.

In the letter Cleveland pointed out the

evils of a "degenerated currency" and asserted that the
people who would benefit least from the proposal of the
silver forces were those who were most vocal in its support,
45Ibid., p. 156.
4 6Ibid ., pp. 156-157.
167.
-

See also Commager, on. cit., p.
.=.
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the farmers and wage earners. 47

Bryan, not to be outdone,

replied to this in an open letter to the President which was
printed in an Omaha newspaper. 48 The Democratic split had
become a gulf which separated the silver faction, of which
Bryan was becoming the recognized spokesman, and the gold
faction, represented by the President.
The Denter of the controversy was the same issue which
the Populists had included in their reform platform of 1892,
which now had been bodily adopted by a large group wi thin
one of the two great parties, and to which the Populists also
were still

adhering.

The silver issue had been only one of

a number of suggested reforms in the campaign of 1892, except
in the Western silver-mining states, and had not been highly
publicized in 1894, because the silverites of
ended fusion arrangements with the Populists.

~be

West had

The issue had

now reached a predaainance unsuspected when it was first
drafted.

Rather than concentrating on &buses and evils which

had been continuing since the Civil War, the minds of the
people in all sections of the nation were becoming fixed on
the single issue of free coinage of silver, an issue whioh
was at best superfiCial. 49
Many Populists opposed this trend toward a single issue

for their party, feeling that the party would lose much of
its strength which it had obtained as a result of the reform

47~••

pp. 158-160, for text.

4 8 Ibid., pp. 160-161.
49Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition
and ~ Men Who Made It, p.lB'6.
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proposals of the Omaha platform.

Former Congressman Tom

Watson of Georgia, one of the original Alliance members of
Congress and a leading Populist spokesman declared:
We favor Free Silver as much as l(e favor
Fiat money--and no more.
We favor Free Silver as much as we favor
Income Tax--and no more.
We hate the greed which strikes down silver in the interest of gold--but we hate Just
as fiercely the Bational Banks ••• , the High
Protective Sariff, ••• and the Railroad
tyranny ••••
Other Populist leaders, however, felt differently, and
there was strong sentiment in the party supporting the view
that the silver question was "the only living issue before
the people."51 State conventions of the Populist party were
urged to "build a platform making the 'money question I the
great central idea, unencumbered with details or side issues."
The object of this concentration upon a single issue, of
course, was for the proselyting value it would have, to gain
more converts to the Populist cause.

The difficulty was,

however, that new recruits brought into the party, on the
basis of this plank

alone were not agrarian Populists at all,
but merely silverites. 53 They rapidly altered the beliefs
of the organization, and while the old-time Populists .till
50 Tom Watson, in an article in People's Party Paper,
quoted in Thomas G. Manning and David M. Potter, Government
!!!S ~ American EconO!l!Y. 1870-Present, p. 220.
51Hicks, ,op,. ill., p. 344.
52 Ibid
53Richard Hofstadter, ~ ~ of Reform, p. 50.

_.

52
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supported the Omaha platform, and used its many planks as
the basis for their political beliefs, the newer party members supported only the one plank which they

~avored,

and

ignored or suppressed the others. 54 .
It became one of the major objectives of the silver
group to wean the old-line Populists away from the Omaha
platform and commit them to the single issue of silver.

That

the demands for political reform and basio democratio aotion
were subverted to the monetary question, which even at the
time was recognized as a "single temporary side issue,"55 is
the tragedy of the eleotion campaign of 1896. 56 In the conventions which preceded the campaign, and in the campaign
itself, the money question was uppermost, and the entire
attention of the American public was concentrated on only
one small facet of the reform movement whioh had begun under
such impressive auspices in 1892.

While Ignatius Donnelly

warned that "the silver question is but an incident in the
great struggle that covers the world,"57 the incident became,
for the American public, the end result, and the greater
scope of political reform was lost for a time in the great
scramble for votes.
When, in the summer of 1896, the three parties were
to meet to nominate their candidates for President and Vice

5~iCkS, £2. ~., p. 319.
55JOhn D. Hicks, "The Politioal Career of Ignatius
Donnelly," M. V. H. ~., VIII (June-September, 1921), 126.
56Avery Craven, Democracy !a American Life, p. 139.
57Hicks, loco cit., p. 126.

--
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President and to promulgate their platforms, the interest of
the nation was concentrated on two specific questions: One,
whether the RepUblicans fram the western silver-producing
states would be able to 8Way their party frail its traditional
adherence to the gold standard, and i t not, what the actions
of the Silver Republicans would be; and, secondly, whether the
Silver Democrats would have enough strength in their party to
force the insertion into the platform of a free silver plank
and to secure the nomination of their candidate for President.
The first party to meet in convention was the Republican,
which met the last of June, at St. Louis.

:r-ediately the

lIIoney question came up, and a lIIajority of the platform cOllllll1ttee reported a plank strongly favoring the gold standard.

It

opposed the free coinage of silver, "except by International
A III1nority of the committee, headed by Senator
agre8lllent."5 8
Teller of Colorado, sublll1tted an alternate plank, which would
pledge the Republicans "to secure the free and unl1lll1ted coinage of gold and silver at our lIIints at the ratio of 16 parts
of silver to 1 of gold."59

Teller's III1nority repprt was

defeated and the majority recommendation was adopted.
With the defaat of his proposed plank, Teller realized
that the s ent1lllent of the convention was unalterably opposed
to his views on the lIIoney question, and he, accompanied by
58Bryan, ~. cit., p. 169. See Appendix III for the
full text of tlii G:-5. P. 1II0ney plank.
59Ibid•
1896). -

See also Pittsburg Headlight, XI (June 25,
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a.veral otner delegatea representing tne states of IdahO,
Soutn Dakota, Utah. and Montana walked out of tne convention.
But before ne left, Teller addressed tne meeting, explaining
nis views on tne ailver issue, and giving nis reason for
"bolting" the convention, saying: "I.oannot, before M7 country
and my God, agree to tnat provill1on tnat anall put upon tnis
country a gold standard and I will not."6O

Tnus tne bolting

of sllverites from tne1r part~, tnreatened by Bryan in 1893,61
actually came to paaa in 1896, althougn it affected a different

part~.

Tne abandoument of tneir

part~

by Teller and tne otner

silver Republicans was viewad witn mixed emotions.

Bryan,

wno attended tne G. O. P. convention aa an observer for an
Omana newspaper, we100med tne move, and immediately wired
back to Nebraska nia auggeations tor tne Democratic plank
on tne question, urging

~diate

adoption, by tne Democratic

party, of an unequivocal free silver plank. 62

Tnia auggeat-

ion waa pub1ianed, and attraoted furtner attention to Bryan
as tne silver spokesman.
Tne

ruti1it~

of Teller's atand waa pointed out

b~

sa.8

of nis opponents, wno, wni1e agreeing tnat tne Colorado
Senator was undoubtedly aineere in his viewa, nne nas never
had the least rational ground for hoping that the Republican
60Bryan, ~. cit., pp. 170-176 oontains the full text of
Teller's apeecn;
61See above, p. 58.

62Bryan, £2. cit., p. 177.
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party would awing over to his ideas. n63

Loyal party lIlembers

drew solace from the tact that while some Western silver
votes were lost to their presidential nominee, William McKinley,
Teller'a move strengthened the chance. that many gold Democrats would tind the Republican party all the more acceptable
to them it the Democrats at their convention should endorse a
tree-silver plank. 64
That such a plank would be endoraed by the Democratic convention, which was to meet in Chicago, seemed more and more a
probabili ty, with the silver movement gaining strength throughout the South and West.

nPitchfork Ben" Tillman of South

Carolina, the man who had opposed the Populi.t movement in hia
state in earlier campaigns,65 threatened to bolt the Chicago
convention if the gold Democrat. secured enough votea to renominate Cleveland or support a gold-standard plank. 66 Arkanaaa, North Carolina and Georgia were other Southern atates
where the movement for free silver was strong, and in each of
these states the Democratic State Conventions had endorsed
platforms calling for free coinage and the 16 to 1 ratio. 67
63Editorial, Kansas City Star, XVI (June 18, 1896), 4.
64Ibid. (June 19, 1896), 6.
65See above, p. 31.
66S1mk1ns , £2. cit., p. 327.
67See The Pittaburg Headlight, XI (June 25, 1896) for
the ArkansaS-Convention, and Ibid. (July 2, 1896), tor the
North Carolina and Georgia conventions. The decisions of
these groups are contained in news dispatohes published on
the dates cited.
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Shortly before the Demooratic convention was soheduled
to begin, President Cleveland, the spokemnan for the "sound
money" faction within the party, addressed an open letter "to
the Democratic Voters," in whioh he outlined his views on the
upocmdng oonvention fight •. "I refuse to believe," he wrote,
"that when the tiae arrive. for deliberate action there will
be engrafted upon our Democratic cr.ed a demand for the free,
unlimited, and independent coinage of silver."68

He pointed

out that he felt that such a course would be harmful to the
party, and would "inflict a very great injury upon every
interest of our country which it has been the mission of
Democracy to advance, and will result in lasting di.a.ter
to our party organization."69
The convention got under way on June 30, with an

~ed

iate credentials fight involving rival delegations from various states, Bryan himself, as a member of the silver delegation from Nebraska, having to sit in the visitors I gallery
due to the reoognition of the gold Democrats fram that state
during the temporary organization of the conventipn. 70

The

dispute on credentials finally being resolved in favor of
the silverites, the convention was then able to get to the
next order of business, the platform.

Here the expected

fireworks materialized I
68Allen Nevins, Letters £! Grover Cleveland, 18$0-1908,
PP. 440-441.

69~.

70Bryan, .!?l!..

ill.,

p. 188.
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A majority of the platform committee was composed of
delegates pledged to free silver, and the committee delivered
a majority report favoring this approach.

Not only did the

report favor free coinage of silver at.16 to 1, it demanded
legislation to forbid "the demonetization of any kind of
legal tender money by private contract," which would eliminate
one of the grievances of the farmers, that of requiring payment of loans or mortgage debts 10 gold, through a clause of
the conbract. 71
The minority of the committee submitted their report,
which called for a maintenance of the gold standard, and stating that the adoption of the suggestions of the majority of
the committee would "not only imperil our finances, but would
retard or entirely prevent the establishment of international
bimetallism....

It would place this country ••• upon a silver

basis, impair contracts, disturb business, diminish the purohasing power of the wages of labor, and inflict irreparable
evils upon our na~ion's commeroe and industry."7 2
Senator Tillman opened the debate on the platform, supporting the majority plank, followed by four minority speakers,
and then by Bryan, who concluded the debate with his famous
"Cross of Gold" speech, after which the majority recommendation
was adopted by a vote of 628 to 301, with only sixteen delegations voting against the platform while thirty-five delegations Toted in favor of it. 73

Nominations for candidates for

71See Appendix _IY.
72Bryan, S!.. oit., pp. 198-199.
73~., pp. 208-209.

72
president then followed, and on the fifth ballot Bryan was
n81ll8d.
Thus the Democratic convention officially want on record,
both in their platform

~d

presidential candidate, as favor-

ing the issue which the Populists had first brought before the
people of the United States four years earlier.

The conven-

tion nominated for vice president Arthur Sewall of Maine, a
prominent industrialist of that state, who had widespread
interests in a shipyard and in railroad ventures, as well as
being for twenty-six years the president of the Bath National
Bank of Maine, although Bryan contended that: "He is opposed
to the present national banking system, although business
necessities have forced him to avail himself of it."74
Shortly after the conclusion of the Democratic convention Senator Teller and other leading Silver Republican
bolters issued a statement supporting the Democratic platform
and nominees, and calling upon all RepUblicans who supported
the free coinage of silver to join with them in support of
the candidates nominated at Chicago.75
The time was now approaching for the Populists to meet
in convention to make their bid for support by the adoption
of their platform, and to nominate their candidates for the
highest offices in the land.

But they had a problem, for

the Democratic convention had definitely "stolen their
pp. 230-231.
pp. 182-187.
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thunder" by adopting their strongest issue, the plank upon
which they were depending to gain the strength necessary for
them to win.

They had gambled on the Democratic party keep-

ing their 1892 platform, and they had lost.
on the horns of a dilemma.

They were, truly,

CHAPTER IV

THE GREAT FUSION FIGHT
Every possible course for the Populists presented a problem:

if they chose to support the candidate and platform of

Chicago they would strengthen the position of their platform,
but they would probably destroy themselves as an independent
party; if they chose not to join with the Democrats, they
would be more able to preserve their party entity, but would
probably guarantee the defeat of the tree silver forces because of the resultant division of the silver votes.

This

was the situation that confronted the members of the People's
Party as they journeyed to St. Louis for their nominating
convention.
Many party members were quite sympathetic with Bryan,
and openly advocated complete endorsement of him by the convention.

This group was growing stronger daily, for the

farm-bred Bryan, who was known to be an extreme advocate of
the basic doctrines of Populism, was accepted by the agrarians
as their friend. l It did not seem too illogical to these
persons that by endorsing Bryan they were supporting a party
which had in the past constituted one of the chief opposition
groups to their own party; they were aware that the only
possibility of victory was to unite with any group which felt
the way they did on the issue of free silver. 2
lEric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny, p. 64.
2Elmer Ellis, "The Silver Republicans and the Election
of 1896," M. v. ~' R., XVIII (March, 1932), 524.

74

p

75
Since the Populist convention was the last of the three,
the~

had only to second the motion made for silver at the

Democratic convention, rather than introduce the question in
the national political debate.

Most of the Southern Populists

had wanted to hold the 1896 convention early in the year, before the other two parties met, but the party's ..national committee, meeting in January, misjudged the strength of the silver Democrats, felt that both the Democrats and Republicans
would declare for the gold standard, and by meeting last the
People's Party could then be in a position to gather all the
dissatisfied silver supporters into their camp.3
As the delegates arrived at St. Louis they aligned themselves into three different factions, each group with their
own ideas regarding the convention and the campaign.

One

group favored the straight endorsement of Bryan and Sewall,
bringing a union of Populist and Democratic groups; another
group desired a fusion electoral ticket pledged to Bryan and
Sewall, but with an independent Populist party organization
which would be in a favorable bargaining position if the
ticket should win; and, thirdly, there were the Middle-ofthe road Populists who favored an independent ticket and
plattol'lll and opposed any attempt t

0

fuse with the Democrats. 4

Southern Populists had supported a plan whereby the convention would nelDe a presidential ticket, adopt a platform,
3Hicks, ~. cit., p. 350.
4Pittsburg Headlight, XI (July 23, 1896),

4.
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and

n~nate

presidential electors in all the states where

there was a Populist state organization, and then, following
the election, cast their electoral votes in combination with
the Democrats for the strongest candldate. 5

The group 1'avor-

ing fusion, however, seemed the stronger, particularly because
this group contained many persons who either had in the past
or hoped in the future to hold elective office, and felt that
fusion was the best way to gain the votes necessary to accomplish this. 6
The fusion question had become the prime oonsideration
of most of the delegates, and this. was to became the

d~nant

theme throughout the convention and the campaign which followed.
The silver issue was to overshadow the great reform planks of
the Omaha platform, but while the silver Democrats really felt
free silver to be a great reform, many Populists felt that it
was only the most insignificant of reforms and many of them
did not even consider it a re1'orm at all. 7

The middle-of-

the-road Populists were included in this last group, for they
were not so enthusiastic about the silver issue that they
were willing to surrender their other contentions for it.
Some of these leaders were from the west, but most of them
were southerners. 8
One of the most artioulate oppor.ents of fUsion was
Ignatius Donnelly, who as early as 1894 called it a "sacrifice

5~. (July 16, 1896), p. 4.
6Barr , ~. cit., p. 1195.
7Henry Demarest Lloyd, "The Populists at St. Louis,"
Review of Reviews, XlV (September, 1896), 302.
8Buck , £2. ~., p. 184.
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of opinions and beli.fs for the sake of plund.r," and declared that "the middle of the road is the place for Populists. ,,9
Donnelly had grave doubts about the reform spirit in the Democratic party, and vi.wed fusion as merely the "selling out" of
the more vital issues and planks of the Omaha platform for the
sake of one rather trivial reform. 10 Senator Peffer of Kansas,
another opponent of fusion, in a statement issued in Washington, D. C.,on June 25, deoried the proposed fusion schemes,
declaring:
I do not think existing conditions warrant
populi8t endors.ment of the d.mocratio presidential ticket, even though the nominee is for
fr.e silv.r. and the platform contains a positive free-silver declaration. I regard the
integrity and perpetuity of the populist party
as e8s.ntial to carrying out the plan of r.form we have .spou••d ••••
••• all that remain. i. for the populi.t
party to maintain it. integrity by nominating
its own candidat•• on it. own platform. ll
On the other side. as chief spoke.man for the fusion .upporters, were General Weaver, the 1892 8tandard-bearer, and
the famous W. H. ("Coin") Harvey.

Weaver, in 1894. had de.-

cribed the position of the opponents of fu.ion when he said:
"I am a middle-of-the-road man but I don't propose to li.
down acro.s it .0 no one can get over me.

Nothing grows in

the middle of the road."12
9nonnelly. in People's Party Paper, quoted in Hicks.

£2. cit., p. 326.

l~ick., "The Political Career of Ignatius Donnelly."

!g£. 2!i., p. 126.

llpitt8burg Headlight, XI (July 2. 1896), 5.
12Hicks, £2. cit., p. 327.

18
Harvey had an elaborate fusion scheme designed, complete
to the parceling out of the spoils.

He proposed the endorse-

ment by the Populists of the Democratic free-silver candidate
for president (he personally favored .Bland), and the nomination, by the Populists, of Senator Marion Butler of North
Carolina for vice-president, and his endorsement by the Democrats.

The Populists would receive the Secretaryships of the

Interior, of Agriculture, of War and of the Navy under his
plan, and Senator Teller would be named Secretary of the
Treasury. 13

The optimistic Hr. Harvey's fusion plan went

further than most of those suggested.

The difficulty was that

neither the Democrats or Populists would cooperate in bringing
it about.
With the opening of the convention, on July 22, Senator
Butler was named temporary chairman, and in hi. acceptance
speech accused the Democrats of committing "petty and grand
larceny by stealing the People's party platform almost in its
entirety."14

Claiming the Democrats were "frightened,"

"alarmed," and "conscience-stricken," he suggested that their
platform was the result of the exposing, by the Populists, of
their "straddling treachery" on the money question. lS
With the replacing of Butler by Senator Allen of
Nebraska as permanent chairman, the fusion force. won their
13pittsburg Headlight, XI (July 2, 1896),
14Bryan , S£. ~., pp. 260-261.
lSIbid.
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fir.t victory.

Allen, who wa••eated by a vote of 758 to

564,16 pre.ented the view. of the fusionist. in his acceptance
speech, when he said:
There are tho.e who de.ire us to promulgate a wild platform that will be the .ubjeot
of ridicule. They want us to take same man as
a candidate for Prel1dent, who is unfit and
unacceptable and who is willing to run, wi th
certain defeat staring him in the face, for
the mere empty honor of being a candidate, and
they will cry to him to "keep in the middle of
the road," b~t they are our enemie., and not
our friend•• I.7
When Allen was elected by such a large majority, indicating control which the fusion force. exeroised over the convention, the anti-fusionists proposed to nominate first the
vice-presidential candidate, for here, unlike the presidential
nomination, there was seriou. contention.

Sewall, the Demo-

cratic nominee, being both a national banker and a railroad
men, personified two of the intere.ts to which the Populists
were most opposed.

Both fusion and anti-fusion forces were

fearful lest Bryan be assas.inated or otherwise removed frau
office and Sewall be then in a position of leadership, representing -the very force. against which they were fighting.
Others argued that with their own candidate for vice president
the Populists could better pre.erve their party organization
and not face

comple~

absorption into the Democratic party.

It was also agreed that the vice presidential candidate
should be a Southerner. 18

l~uck, .22. ill., pp. 184-185.
17Bryan, .22. cit., pp. 268-269.
18Hicks, .22. ill., p. 364.
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With the vote for the changing of the rules, the compromiae on the vice presidency was almoat a reality.

When the

roll-call of states was read for the purpose of nomination,
aix candidatea were named, only two of whom were significant,
Thomas E. Watson of Georgia, and Sewall.

On the first ballot

Watson was nominated, receiving 469 votes, while Sewall polled

257 votes. 1 9
When it became apparent that the Popul1ata were going to
amend the rules and nominate their vice-presidential candidate
before their presidential nominee, Senator James K. Jones of
Arkansas, the Democratic National Chairman, telegraphed Bryan,
asking hia advice as to a oourse of action if Sewall was not
nominated.

Bryan, answering, instructed him to withdraw his
name as a candidate if Sewall was not named. 20 Bryan1s telegram was not taken seriously by the Populista, who, by the
time it was publiahed, were well into the floor fight for the
vice-presidential nomination.
On the next day the convention met to hear the report of
the platform oommittee, which submitted a

propos~d

platform

stressing the free coinage of silver, but also calling for
an income tax, postal savings banks, government ownership of
railroads and telegraph lines, the initiative and referendum,
and direct election of President, vice-president and senators. 21

19Buck , ~. cit., p. 185.
20
Bryan, ~. cit., p. 297.
21Ibid., pp. 271-276, for text.
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By this time the nomination of Bryan was almost assured,
in spite of a resolution introduced by the Missouri delegation,
as follows:

"Resolved, That we, the delegates ot the State

of Missouri to the national convention of the People's party
are opposed to the nomination or endorsement of W. J. Bryan
for president, or any other democrat or republican. n22
Bryan's name was placed in nomination by General Weaver,
who called tor complete support for the Chicago nominee.

His

reasons were as follows:
The recent convention as Chicago sounded
a bugle call for union which can neither be
misunderstood or go unheeded. In its patriotic
utterances and action it swept away all middle
ground, and opened the road to formidable organic alliance. They not only made union possible--thank heaven, they have rendered it inevitable.
From the very beginning, our organization
has made party fealty subordinate to principle •••• 2 3
Following Weaver's speech, Bryan's nomination was
seconded by General Field of Virginia, the 1892 vice-presidential candidate, Jerry Simpson, Ignatius Donnelly, and
many other prominent Populists, including a delegate fram
Missouri who had apparently forgotten about the recent resolution introduced by his state.24
The only other name placed in nomination was that ot
Colonel S. F. Norton of Illinois.

The results ot the first

ballot were 1,042 votes for Bryan, 340 tor Norton. 25

22 Pittsburg Headligpt, XI (July 23, 1896),
23 Bryan, ~. £11., pp. 276-279.
24Ibid., p. 279.
25Ibid •
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With the nomination of Bryan the triumph of the fusion
forces was nearly complete.

True, they had lost a battle when

Watson was named for the vice-presidency, but many of them
felt that the Democrats would withdraw the name of Sewall and
substitute that of the People's party candidate.

This was,

in fact, the basi. for Watson's acceptance of the nomination,
and many Populists believed that Senator Jones, the Democratic
National Chairman, had promised that he llOuld work toward that
end. 26
Bryan, however, had other views, and expressed regret
that the St. Louis convention had not nominated Sewall.

He

pointed out that he had instructed his name be withdrawn as
a candidate when Sewall was defeated for the nomination, but
that this was not done; and he stated that there were several
planks in the Populist platform which he did not approve.
He hastened to point out, however, that his first concern was
with the free silver issue, and he would do nothing to injure
the chances for a silver victory.27

His position was made

easier tor him by a letter tram Sewall urging him to accept
the Populi.t nomination in the interest ot victory at the
polls, and by the end of the CUlpugn Bryan could conclude
that two vice-presidential candidates were better than one,
and as a result the silver cause had gained votes. 28
The defeat of the middle-of-the-road taction, however,
26aicks, .2E,. ill., p. 365.
27Bryan, .2E,. ill., p. 297.
28 Ibid ., p. 298.
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and the association of the People's Party with the Democratic
cause, was the source of considerable concern to some reformers,
like Henry Demarest Lloyd, who wrote that: "The People's Party
has been betrayed •••• "

He pointed 6ut that if the Populists

had been organized around a clear-cut principle, and had not
vacillated with the silver issue, it could never have been
"seduced" into fusion, "nor induced even to consider the nomination of a man like Bryan who rejects its bottom doctrine. ,,29
He complained that the Populists had "'shot the chutes' of
rusion and landed in the deep waters of Democracy," which he
called "that bourne from which no reform party returns--as
yet."3 0
At the same time that the Populists were meeting in St.
Louis, the free-silver Republicans, led by Teller, were holding a convention in the same city of the newly-formed National Silver Party.

The decision to hold their convention in

close proximity with the People's Party caused the Silver
Party to be associated with the Populists in the minds of
many persons,3 1 but they disclaimed any Populist,leadership,
saying that they differed from the People's Party on all
questions except that of tree s11ver. 32

This group adopted
33
a platform dealing entirely with the silver issue, and nomi-

nated Bryan and Sewall as its candidates. 34
29Quoted
30 Lloyd,
3 1 Ellis,
3 2 Ibid.,

in Manning and Potter, .22.
~. ill., p. 298.
~. cit., p. 521.

ill., pp. 224-225.

pp. 521-522.
33Bryan, ~. cit., p. 252--for their platform.
34Pittsburg Headlight, XI (July 30, 1896), 3.
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The silver Republicans hastened to assure their constituents. however, that their support for the Democratic nominee
did not mean that they were abandoning their traditional
views on other issues.

In a letter publicized to explain

their position. they 8ffirmed that it was not necessary tor
silver Republicans to "abandon or surrender their political
views on other questions," but to concentrate solely on a
victory for silver. 35
Following the conventions. the silverites were faced
with the problem of effectively uniting their forces to meet
the Republican threat in November.

While the supporters of

the gold standard were strongly united in the Republican
ranks, and were looking for aid trom gold Democrats dissatisfied with the Chicago nominee, the silver forces were divided
into three groups, Democrats, Populists and National Silverites.

The task that lay ahead was to unite these three forces

into one effective team to defeat the Republicans and bring
victory to the cause of free silver.
any hope of victory,

Fusion was essential for

and this meant not only fusion on elec-

toral tickets for Bryan but on state and congressional tickets,
for the task lay not only in electing a free-silver president,
but in winning seats for congressmen, and in electing state
legislatures who in turn would name senators who would support
the silver issue, thus strengthening the position of the
silver forces in the Congress.
35ElliS,

Loc.

cit . , P . ; ; J~32 •
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The Populists, old veterans of many a fusion battle in
the past, clearly recognized the problems whioh would arise
s a result of the decision to fuse.

Shortly after the close

of the convention, an address was issued by the Populist
National Chairman, Marion Butler, which outlined the possible
oourses of action which the party could follow.

It established

two a1ternatives: first, for every state to run a straight
Bryan and watson tioket, without any attempt at fusion with
the Democrats; and, secondly, working first for a silver victory by conceding electors to Bryan and Sewall in return for
fusion arrangements which would give the opportuni ty for
electing some Bryan and Watson electors. 36
The first of these suggestions, the committee felt,
would have the same result as the placing of a separate Populist presidential nominee in the field at St. Louis, namely
the splitting of the silver vote and the certain election of
McKinley.

The second issue showed the most promise, and the

oommittee felt it would give the greatest opportunity for the
eleotion of Watson electors, and was the most

cert~in

assuring the victory of the advocates of free silver.

way of
The

committee warned, however, that the way would not be easy.
for some PopUlists would advocate the middle of the road, and
would attempt to block fusion attempts, and some Democrats,
dissatisfied with Bryan, would attempt to remove Populist
eleotors f ram the ballots. 37
3 6Bryan, ££. cit., p. 293, for text of the address.

37~•• pp. 293-294.
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In same areas the fusion problem was easily solved.

In

Kansas, for example, where fusion between Populists and Democrats had worked well in 1892, the union between the
forces was quickly accomplished.

Kan~as

~wo

Democrats, at their

state convention, voted to a ccept the Populist nominees for
state offices in return for the People's Party supporting
Democratic presidential electors. 38 The Populists agreed to
abandon their vice-presidential candidate, and accepted the
n.weratic electors; and, in return, as quickly as the Democratic convention learned the names of the Populist nominees
for the various state offices, they were endorsed. 39

Same

anti-fusion Populists complained that the fusion ticket candidates were "either Democrats or ••• had always been Democrats
at heart though in the Populist Party. ,,40

The iconoclasts

organized a Middle-of-the road Populist Party, but did not
nominate a state ticket, being handicapped by the fact that
whatever action they took against the fusion ticket, they
would succeed primarily in aiding their hated enemy, the
Republicans.

They did endorse a slate of Bryan--Watson elec-

tors, however.
In Iowa another example of enthusiastic fusion occurred,
which divided the electural ticket, giving the Democrats nine
electors; the Populists, two; and the Silver RepUblicans,
one.

All state offices were to go to the Democrats, with the
38pittsburg Headlight, XI (August 13, 1896), 3.
39Ibid., p.

40Barr,

~.

5.
£!i., p. 1192.
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exception'of state auditor, which was given to the Silver
Republicans.4 1

This fusion agreement was reached at a con-

ference of t he three parties, held on August 11, and it was
expected that the Populist state convention would readily
agree, since they had instructed their delegation at the St.
Louis convention to "do all in their power to secure a union
of all reform forces on a common ticket •••• ,,4 2 The fusion
agreement was ratified by the Populists at their state convention held the next month.

They were apparently satisfied

with their share of the prospective spoils, which was not
ungenerous of the Iowa Democrats, since in 1894 the Populists
had only polled 8.23 per cent of the vote in that state. 43
But while fusion agreements were rather easily arranged
in many states of the Middle Border, in the South it was a
different story, for there the Populists suddenly found themselves on the side of the party which they had formerly opposed, against their former associates, the Republicans.

In

most of the states of the South the Democrats firmly refused
to fuse themselves with the Populists, for they

w~re

fairly

sure of victory and saw no reason to have to divide the
spoils.

In five states, however, fusion tickets were ob-

tained.

These were Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Kentucky,

and North Carolina.44

In Missouri, where the Populists had

41pittSburg Headlight, XI (August 13, 1896),

5.

42Herman Clarence Nixon, "The Populist Movement in Iowa"

~ J8urnal of History and Politica, XXIV (January, 1926), A8.
43Hicks, ~. cit., p. 337.
44Ibid., pp. 369-370.
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polled only 8.45 per cent of the vote in 1894,45 the fight was
especially bitter.
The Missouri Populists had expressed their feeling on the
matter of fusion with their resolution against Bryan's candidacy,4 6 but by the end of the convention were more enlightened
about the trend within their party; and by the end of July the
Populists were actively working for a fusion ticket.

The

People's Party was reportedly seeking eight of the state's
Eventeen presidential electors, and were willing to agree not
to put a state ticket in the field against the Democrats if
this condition were met. 41 Chairman Albert Rozzelle of the
State Populist Committee was reported to favor a less arbitrary agreement with the Democrats, whereby the Populists
would get four electors and the Democrats thirteen, but he
and his supporters were also anxious to run_a state Populist
ticket. 48
By the time of the state Populist convention, which was
being held at Sedalia, it was observed that: "The most active
workers ••• among the Populists ••• were Democrats," including
such Democratic state notables as Governor Stone, whose reported argument was: "I want Bryan; so do you.

Now why can't

we each help to secure his election by giving him all the
strength of both parties?"49
45Ibid., p. 331.
46See above, p. 81.
41Pittsburg Headlight, XI (July 30, 1896), 4.
48Kansas City
49~.

~, XVI

(July 30, 1896), 1.
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The convention was opened by Rozzelle, who acted as
temporary chairman. 50

An

immediate fight developed over the

acceptance of a report by the platform committee, which called
for a "union of forces with the democrats of the state on the
electoral and congressional tickets.,,5 1 Mter a considerable
debate, this motion was accepted by the convention by a vote
of 267 to 132, and fusion in Missouri became a tact. 52 A
Populist state ticket was nominated, but the candidate. for
governor later withdrew from the race and his place was never
filled, apparently in a further etfort to consolidate with
the Democrats. 53
In Louisiana, the fusion between Republicans and Populists
had endured through the state elections early in 1896; but by
the time of the presidential campaign most of the Populists
had successtully crossed the political party line and found
themselves co-operating with their former opponents, the
Democrats. 54

Thus the year 1896 found the People's Party in

that state tused with both parties, one on the national and
the other on the state ticket.
In North Carolina, where the Populist-Republican tusion
of 1894 had paid rich dividends, this policy was continued,
with tusion candidates nominated for all state oftices except
governor and lieutenant governor; while the national and
50pittsburg Headlight, XI (August 6, 1896), 3.
51 Ib id., p. 5.
52 Ib ld.
53~s, .2R.,. ill., p. 370.
54whlte, loco ill., p. 17.
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congreasional ticket waa fused between Populista and Democrats.
in an interesting display of political adaptability.55

In

Arkansas. the Populists nominated their own candidates for
atate officea, but made no

co~gressional nominationa. 56

In the far West, the National Silverites were faced with
the difficulty of being without an organizational nucleus
around which to organize their campaign,57 and this fact helped
the fusion movea by enabling the ail veri tes to work in close
co-operation with the eatabliahed Populist and Democratic parties.

Fusion ticketa were aoon aet up in Montana, Washington

and Idaho. 58

In the mountain states, where the sentiment for

silver was atrongest, it was not the Populists or Democrats
who won, but "an illicit and slightly incongenial marriage of
both to the bigamist (and opportunist) Free Silver."59

But

while there waa little difficulty in fusing the three parties
in the West on a cammon electoral slate, in Idaho the Populista and Democrata opposed the National Silverites on the
state level, and in Montana and Nebraska the silver party was
kept from the ballot on the grounda of 1 egal obstaoles. 60
The importance of the silver isaue in the campaign is
demonstrated by the fact that one contemporary news magazine
55Hicks, ~. ~., pp. 371-372.
56Ibid., p. 370.
57ii'lla, ~.~., p. 524.

58H1cka, ~. ill., p. 370.
59wllliam Diamond, "Urban ~d Rural Voting in 1896,"
American Hiatorical Review, XLVI (Jahuary, 1941), 293.
60Ellia , ~. ~., p. 532.
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devoted eight and one-hall columns to t he silver question,
and two and one-half columna to all the other issues of the
campaign.

The article ended with the prophesy that McKinley

would be elected and that: "With this election the coinage
issue may perhaps disappear from American politics. "61
Perhaps the most significant analysis of the importance
of silver, however, comes from an avowed "Eastern Democrat •••
unable to transform himself into an advocate either of the
free coinage of silver or of populiem••• ,"62 who wrote:
One thing is clear; the time has gone by
when the political movement for monetary reform
which has now expressed itself in the demand of
the Chicago platform for the free, independent,
and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of
16 to 1, can be laughed out of court with mere
ridicule •••• Nothing is to be gained by simply
shrieking "Populists, repudiators, and Anarchists" at those who have proved themselves
numerous enough t 0 exercise complete control
over the present course of one
the great political parties of the country. 3

gr

Others saw in the silver issue a threat to the America
which they knew, the status quo, which they were anxious to
defend.

William Allen White, the vociferous Kansas Repub-

lican editor, wrote on July 31, 1896, that: "The right
between the political parties today is for existing American
institutions and against them."64

White saw growing in the

United states, and particularly in Kansas, "the un-American
61Lyman Abbott, "A Summing-up of the Vital Issues of
1896," Review of Reviews, XIV (Novsmber, 1896), 544-549.
62Josiah Quincy, "Issues and Prospects in the Campaign,"
North American Review, CLXIII (August, 1896), 182-183.
63 Ibid., PP. 183-184.
64wi11iem Allen White, Editorial, Emporia Gazette, quoted
in Helen Ogden Mahin, The Editor and His People, p. 237.
(Hereafter cited as MaEm, ~. cit.) ---
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doctrine of state paternalism.,,65

White's comments reflect

vividly the attitude of the nineteenth century political conservative, and are worth examining if for no other reason than
they represent the political philosophy which triumphed not
too long ago.
White wrote:
It is claimed ••• that when one man is
weak ••• the state should help him up.... It
is the duty of the state to check the accumulation of one man's wealth and to end another
man's poverty. They say that the man with the
large fortune and the man who commits a crime
are both subjects for state interference. They
say that the man who is without means is the
nation's ward, that he should be protected
against the "oppression of wealth."
These two theories are violently ant agonistic--one is American, Democratic, Saxon;
the other is European, Socialistic, Latin. o6
Paternalism should play no part in goverrunent, White
wrote, it should be free for all, "and in the end the keenest, most frugal, and most industrious win.
RepUblican party, is as it should be.,,67

That, says the

In another editor-

ial, written on the eve of the election, White voices relief
that the country apparently will escape "a revolution to a
mild yet dangerous form of Socialism," and predicts that
"the matter is settled for this generation.,,68
Republicans feared and distrusted the Democrats and
their allie8, and

one~rom1nent

Republican went so far as

65Ibid., pp. 241-242.
66 Ibid •
67Ibid., p. 239.
68wUliam Allen White, 40 Years £!! Main Street, pp.
300-301, quoting an editoriaI:
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to cla1m that

"Mr.

Bryan numbers among his followers 99 per

cent of the dishonest people of the country; the men who are
enemies to society and have no interest in the preservation
of this country as a nation."69
This view was even shared. to SOMe extent. by some erstwhile Populists. who saw in their former political bedfellows men "who would trade everything. anything. all things.
for the hope of continuing themselves in office."70 Indeed
some former Populists were. by the end of the campaign. ta1king in the same sentences about "political combinations and
traitors" and implying that anyone connected with the BryanPopulist fusion party fitted this category.7 1
But in spite of all the adverse publicity of these
writers. the Populists and Democrats were confident.

In

Kanaas they isaued a statement aaying: "our opponenta are
fighting among themselves as never before ••••
are ripe for proselyting.
The issue would be

The conditions
Victory is within our grasp."7 2

J10W

up to the people. and upon the

outcome of the balloting would rest the future of the issue.
69T• C. Platt. "The Effect of Republican Victory." North
American Review. CLXIII (November. 1896). 514.
70"Populiam." Pamphlet issued by the Middle-of-the-Road
Populist Committee. in ~ulist Party Pamphlets. Kansas State
Historical Society coll~1on.
71 Ibid.
72"A Measage and Plan for County Candidates." Headquarters. People's Party and D8JIlocratic State Camm1ttees. in
Kansaa State Historioal Society collection. Populist Party
Pamphlets.
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the coalition, and the reform movement in general.

The Popu-

lists had run their race, now they waited for the decision of
the judges.
When the votes were counted McKinley had won, carrying
every state North of the Ohio and East of the Mississippi,
plus Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon and California.
The Republicans won not only the executiTe, but also the Congress.

The fusion forces, however, had won some fights, for

example, in Kansas, where they swept to victory in the state
contests, and gave Bryan the state's electoral votes.

Bryan

polled more than 12,000 votes above McKinley's total, the
state fusion ticket ran nearly as well, and all the fusion
congressional candidates were elected except in the first and
fourth districts. 73

Crawford county followed the trend,

giving Bryan and Sewall 4,758 votes, McKinley and Hobart
3,680 votes, and Bryan and Watson fifteen votes. 74

This shows

how little influence the middle-of-the roaders had on the
average voter.
In an analysis of the electoral vote, the predominant
fact is the weakness of Bryan in the Northeast, and the
strength which he showed in the rural areas.

Out of a total

vote of 6,493,441, the urban vote for Bryan was only
1,212,127. 75

In every southern state, with the exception of

Virginia, Bryan's rural majorities were higher than his urban
73 Harrington, loco cit., p. 441.

74pittsburg He~ig~ XII (November 5, 1896), 5.
75
Diamond, loco £!i., p. 285.
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totals, and in the west, the cities tended to support the
Republicans.

St. Joseph, St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri;

Kansas City, Kansas; and Omaha, Nebraska, all gave majorities
to McKinley; it was the rural populations which turned the
tide to Bryan. 76
The Populist influence in the campaign corresponded to
the relative radicalism of the area.

In centers of Populist

strength the cities were not as enthusiastic about Bryan as
were the rural areas; but where the People's Party was weak
Bryan tended to poll more urban votes, such as in Virginia,
which was considered the weakest Populist state in the South,
where the cities gave Bryan greater majorities. 77
A total of twenty-eight states had worked out fusion
agreements, either dividing Bryan electors or supporting the
same electoral ticket.

Of this number, fifteen gave majori-

ties to these fusion tickets. 78
had not worked well enough.

Fusion had worked, but it

The battle was lost, and the

future ahead was canything but bright.

76~., p. 290.
77~., pp. 302-303, and footnote 18, p. 303.

78See Appendix V.
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CHAPTER V

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FUSION
The Republicans were exultant following the election of
McKinley, and were certain that the election had settled the
money question.

The issue had been decided by the people,

and the gold standard had won.

"It will be the beginning of

a new era in ••• this country," they proclaimed;

"The night-

mare of Populism, Anarchy and Socialism will have been
banished, and will not return to trouble our sleep in the
future. ,,1
They had just cause to be pleased, for while the freesilver issue had sorely tried the party,in the states West of
the Mississippi, it had given it, by way of compensation,
what it never before had enjoyed, the nearly solid support of
the business interests of the Middle West and Northeast, the
areas which not only would serve to elect presidents, but
also to give the party a commanding majority of votes in both
houses of the Congress. 2
Another cheerful fact,. for the
G. O. P., was that while Bryan's total vote was large, if the
votes of the Silver Republicans and Populists were deducted
from the fusion totals, it would appear that the strictly
Democratic voting strength had shrunk since 1892. 3

~. C. Platt, "The Effect of Re:publican Victory," North
American Review, CLIIII (November, 1896), 515.
2Ar thur N. Holcombe, The Middle Class in American
Politics, pp. 188-189.
---3David B. Hill, "The Future of the Democratic Organization," Forum, XXII (February, 1897), 651.
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The Democrats, on the other hand, were suffering frCllll
a paucity of explanations for their debacle, and were still
certain that their great free-silver
capital.

"cause" was good political

"The contest for financial independence will go on,"

Bryan prophesied, and cheered his followers with the assertion
that while the silver forces entered the campaign a disorganized group, "we emerge from it a united and disciplined force
without the loss of a soldier." 4
The "united front," however, began soon to disintegrate,
beginning with the almost immediate decline of the Populists.
The party was sutfering, as ex-Senator Peffer put it, frCllll
"political anaemia," brought on by taking "too much Democracy.,,5

He predicted that the fusion Populist. would con-

tinue to co-operate with the Democrats as long as Bryan was
their candidate, but that the anti-fusion forces would not
ally themsel-Yes with the Democratic party, "no matter who is
its candidate.,,6
In spite of the victory of the fusion forces in Kansas,
the decline of Populist power in that state soon became apparent, and while the fusioD Populists . were certain that
their party would remain strong, assuring their followers
that: "We have preserved everywhere our Party integrity,,,7 the

4w.

J. Bryan, "Has the Election Settled the Money
Question'," North American Review, CLXIII (December, l896),
7l0.
A. Peffer, "The Passing of the People's Party,"
!.!?£.. ci~., p. l6.
6Ibid., p. l8.
7~ Farmers Advocata, VIII (November ll, l896), 2.

5w.
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Populists soon began rapidly to desert the party's standards.
Ex-Republicans soon began returning to the secure folds of
their former party, not wishing to be placed in the disturbing
situation of having to co-operate with Democrats in the state
administration if they remained Populists, and due to the fact
that the national Republican ticket had made such a significant showing.8

By the year 1898 the party was not able to put

up an independent tight, depending again upon tusion with the
Democrats. 9
Bryan's boast began to have a hollow ring.

In the South,

too, Populism began a noticeable decline, with the third-party
forces gradually returning to the Democratic ~arty .10

While

the Bryan forces did not suffer the loss of voter strength in
the South that they did in the Western states, the Populist
party as such was severely taxed, and by 1900 had ceased
placing candidates in the field. ll
Why did this sudden disintegration take place?
reasons are paramount for the demise of Populism:

Two
First,

tusion, which destroyed the party entity, by ass09iating it
with the Democrats, whose candidate it adopted; secondly, the
free-silver issue, which was only a minor part of the Omaha
platform, but which grew to such stature as to overshadow; the
other reforms of

~he

Populists and make them a single-issue

8 Barr, loco cit., PP. 1193.
9~.
lOwhite, loco
llIbid.

ill.,

p. 19.
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party.12

In 1898, the People's Party did fuse with the Demo-

crats in elections in Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, the Dakotas,
Oregon and California, but in each case the Republicans emerged
triumphant, in Kansas winning control of the state offices and
legislature, and electing all their congressional candidates
but one. 13

In the Fifty-Sixth congress, elected in 1898,

there were only six congressmen who professed to be either
Populists or Fusionists,14 as caupared to thirty-one Populists,
Fusionists and Silverites in the Fifty-Fourth congress, elected
in 1894. 15

As for the anti-fusion Populists, in the 1898 elec-

tion they polled hardly as many votes in all the Northern
states as the Socialist party received in the state of Massa16
chusetts alone.
By 1900 a Populist Party pamphlet was warning fusion
Populists who believed that union with the Democrats was in
the best interest of the country that they should wait and see
what they would have to fuse with, adding:

"If the political

lion and lamb lay down together, the lamb will be on the
inside.,,11 But this warning had little effect, for the decadent
12John D. Hicks, "The Third Party Tradition in American
Politics," ~. v. ~. ~., XX (June, 1933), 20.
13Hicks, £2. ~., pp. 394-395.
14congressional Directory, 56th Congress, Session 1,
December 8, 1899, pp. 143-150.
15Ibid ., 54th Congress, Session 2, December 12, 1896,
pp. 315-322.
16"The Populist Factions," Review of Reviews, XXI
(June, 1900), 041.
-11From a pamphlet in the Populist Party Pamphlets collection, Kansas State Historical SocIety, Topeka.
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Populist organization. much of its political capital stolen
from it by Bryan and the New Republican. Theodore Roosevelt,
found little excuse for further existence.

It meekly accepted

Bryan as its candidate in 1900. together with his Democratic
running-mate. 18

The Middle-of-the-road Populists nominated

the vitriolic Tom Watson of Georgia, who polled the miserable
total of 50.373 votes, 34.000 less than the Social Democrats
and only 11.000 more than the Socialist Labor candidate.
while Bryan was receiving 6.374.397 votes and McKinley.
19
7.206.677.
By 1902 even the Populist name ceased to appear on the
ballot in the state of its birth. Kansas. where the Democrats
and Populists agree on a state ticket to run under the banner
of the former.

The Kansas Populist party. which twice had

been able to command more than one hundred thousand Kansas
votes. disappeared. 20
The death of the Populist party was an occurrence which
could be seen from the beginning. for the People's Party
arose to remedy the conditions which created it. ~l and when
this mission was accomplished. by legislation orcircumstance.
the party no longer had any excuse for existence.

Throughout

their history the people who comprised the Populist party
proclaimed that if only the Republican party (if in the west).
l8Harrington, loco cit., pp. 447-448.
19APpleton's Annual Cyclopedia, 1900, p. 721.
20Harrington. ~. £!i., p. 448.
21Miller. loco

£!i.• p. 467.
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or the Democratic party (if in the South), were as good as it
once was, they would vote for it again.

As early as 1893

writers and political observers were forecasting that as soon
as conditions improved for the farmers, as soon as they were
relieved of some of the economic pressures under which they
suffered, they would become reluctant "to ride forty miles
in a lumber wagon through the rain to hear Mrs. Lease and
General Weaver make speeches.,,22
More money was soon forthcoming for the tarmers.

The

discovery of gold in Alaska increased the bullion supply.
In 1895 there was $484,128,541 in gold in circulation, by
1896,

511,143,229, and by 1898

~661,196,519;

addition to more than ,65,000,000

and this in

in silver dollars and more

than ~10,000,000 in subsidiary silver coins. 23
In addition to the increase in the supply of standard
money available, other conditions began to improve for the
farmer which made him become less concerned with seeking
redress through politics.

As one observan put it:

"Into

three periods may be divided the business historY,of the
western Mississippi Valley--settlement, extravagance, and
depression.

Upon a fourth it is nowentering.,,24

A new day

was indeed dawning in the West, and the farmers were
22C• S. Gleed, "The~e Significance of Western Unrest,"
Forum, XVI (October, 1893), 251.
23Appletonls Annual Cyclopedia, 1896, p. 194; 1898,
p. 815.
24Charles M. Harger, "New Era in the Middle West,"
Harper's New Monthly Magazine, XCVII (July, 1898), 216.
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appreciating it.

The crops were better, the rains had come,

the prices remained high, new sewings looked favorable, the farmer
was able to make a profit, and what is even more important, was
able to reduce, and in many cases eliminate, the grinding burden
of debt which had for so many years encumbered him. 25

As one

observer, a mortgage broker by trade, saw it:
A farmer came into my office one day last
summer wearing ragged, faded clothes, and appearing very shabby. "Look ~retty tough, don·t
I?" he remarked, laughing.
Well, it will be
better next time. I am going to buy a new
suit of clothes this afternoon. I have not had
a new suit of clothes for five years--just
couldn't afford it. My wife has been saving
her egg money, and I have kept up the taxes
and interest. Now we are getting out of the
woods, and I am to h_ve a suit and she a dress
from the egg-money.26
This was the crux of the matter--the farmer was "getting
out of the woodS," and when he did he was also getting out of
the Populist party, and returning to the political fold.
There were, of course, other factors in the returning farm
prosperi ty.

Railroads, for example, became keenly aware of

competition, and began enticing the farmer's business with
rate reductions.

The Rock Island, f or example, reduced

tariffs from Kansas City to Chicago for wheat and flour to
thirteen cents per hundredweight; corn and oats, eleven cents;
and flax and millet, fourteen cents; while the Missouri
Pacific reduced rates to St. Louis to eight cents for wheat
and flour and nine for flax and millet. 27
25 Ibid., p. 278.
26 Ibid •
27pittsburg Headlight, XI (July 16, 1896), 7.
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Diversification of agriculture played a great part in
the return of prosperity to the Middle Border states, ,with
the introduction of crops more suitable to the land.

The

farmer's "egg-money" illustrates a vital source of revenue to
many farmers, while the monthly milk check, in payment for
milk purchased by dairies, constituted another souce of income.
Instead of relying entirely upon wheat or corn, the farmers
began raising cattle, which could subsist upon the prairie
grass much easier than the plow could break through it, and
began planting such o.rops as kaffir corn which thrived during periods of drought which would have killed many other
crops.

In the crop-year of 1897, for example, nearly ten mil-

lion dollars worth of kaffir corn was harvested from western
fields. 28

****i:'
The phenomenon of the Populist party was not that it
came into being, wrote a platform of reforms, and then succumbed; this happened to the Liberal Republican, Independent
Reform, Greenback, Anti-Monopoly and

ther parties founded
following the Civil War, as well as the Populists. 29 The
0

thing that makes the Populist party unique is the change
which it wrought upon its members, and through fusion with
other parties, ultimately upon them also.

The strength of

the Populist party was never in its million or so members,
28Harger, loco cit., p. 280.
29
-Barr, !2£. cit., pp. 1115-1116.
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but in the influence which these people and their ideas had
on the rest of the American public;

else how could this rather

amall nuaber have had such widespread effect upon American
political life.

The very life of the "party hung by a thread

in 1896. yet its position was vitally important to both the
older parties.

How close Populiam came in 1896 to being al-

most completely forgotten by the mass of the American electorate was pointed out by Senator W. E. Chandler. who wrote that:
"The Populists would have made little figure with their demonstration." if the Republicans had stood for "sound money as
defined and understood by the great mass of the Republicans
•••• " and the Democrats for "sound money as understood by the
Cleveland Democrats."30 This did not occur. however. and the
Populists were spared--to die after the campaign. when Bryan.
"driven to seek a home among the Populists ••• brought trouble
to his kind hosts ••• "3 l
The effect of the Populists in 1896 was so great that
one analyst. writing more than a half-eentury atter the pressures of" the campaign. could conclude that: "The fopulist
spirit captured the Democratic party in 1896 ••• "3 2

This was

apparent to contemporaries. also. one of whom wrote:

"the

fact cannot be disguised that the success of free silver at
3Ow. E. Chandler. "Issues and Prospects in the Campaign."
North American Review. CLXIII (August. 1896), 115-116.
31Andrew Carnegie. "Mr. Bryan~ the Conjurer." North
American Review. CLXIV (January, 1~91). 109.
32Richard Hofstadter.

Ia! ~ 2£ Reform. pp. 4-5.
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Chicago meant the birth of a new party....

Almost the only

link which connects it traditionally with the old Democratic
party is the candidate for the Vice-PreSidency ••• n33
Democrats were among the first to

re~ogn1ze

Gold

this change. not

only in the platform. but in the spirit of their party.

They

charged that the Chicago convention was a nrepudiation of old
and well-establishad Democratic principles and the substitution of new and dangerous populistic doctrines in their stead."
The accomplishments of the "new party." which Mrs. Bryan
could list with pride as being the causes which her husband
championed. have a curiously familiar ring.

She listed the

federal income tax. direct election of senators. woman suffrage, a Department of Labor in the president1s cabinet. more
strict railroad regulation. currency reform. state initiative
and referendum. and others. 35

Compare these with planks from

the Omaha platform which later were enacted into law:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

The Australian Ballot.
Direct election of Senators.
Initiative. Referendum and Recall.
Federal Reserve Act.
Warehouse Act of 1916 Ithe sub-treasure plan).
National control of Railroads and Telegraph.
Conservation of Natural Resources.
Income tax.36

As one contemporary writer put it:

"We no longer recognize the divine right of wealth and cussedness." 37
33"Mr. Brranls New Radical Party." Review of Reviews. XIV
(October. 1896). 391.
34aill, loco cit •• P. 644. The writer was a New York
Senator, and a-Bupporter of the Cleveland faction in 1896.
35Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, p. 195.
36Bicks, ~.

PP. 407-408.

37Barr •

pp. 1194-1195.

£!1••
~. £!1••

34
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These were the direct political accomplishments of the
People's Party, not direct in the sense that they were strong
enough to enact them into law, but direct in the sense that
the Populists were the ones who publicized these issues. took
them before the public on thousands of stump speeches, made
them to some degree "respectable" to the America,n people; and
while the Populists party was falling to pieces, carried them
to the other parties, where they took firm root. and thrived
in the hearts of Republicans and Democrats who such a short
time before had been bitterly fighting against these very
things.
In this manner the relatively few people who actually were
active Populists were able to make their ideas known to. and
eventually respected by. the majority of the American people.
The Populist organization "fulfilled its third-party function.
It transferred one of the major parties, had a sharp impact
on the

0

ther. and in the not too long run saw most of its pro-

gram became law.,,38

The People's Party was the first organiza-

tion to bring before the American people in a rull-scale campaign the great reform issues of the nineteenth century. the
ideas which have become so firmly imbedded into the political
consciousness of the twentieth; and they were the first group
which placed these reform programs before the nation with the
hope of ultimately securing relief through legislation for
the ills which they saw and the grievances which they felt. 39

p.

14.

38Hotstadter. The ~ of Reform, p. 108.
39pefter, "The passing of the People's Party,"

12£.

cit.,
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The fact that they were successful in this is illustrative of
the profound influence which the pUblicizing of these ideas
had on the other parties, which, rather than the Populists,
were given the task of putting the proposed reforms into execution.

As far as political power is concerned, Populiam was a

failure, for, as Professor Hicks said:

"The Populist Party

lived only to die. ,,4o
But there was something beyond the mere enumeration of
political strength, the mere counting of ballots on election
day, the mere numbering of members in the organization.

The

Populist movement, in this respect did die, but in another
and perhaps a greater sense the movement lived on, for, as
Hicks continues: "But Populism was good on diagnosis, even
when it was faulty on prescription.
ment it was a great success."4 1

As an educational move-

This is undoubtedly the central point in the importance
of the influence of Populiam on the American people.

Populism

awakened the American people to the study of the problems of
the time in which they lived, and by so doing

st~lated

the

greatest interest in economics which the United States has
seen.4 2

When a Populist speaker finished talking about the

evils of Wall Street and the need for controlling the railroads, people thought about what was said, whether they
40HiCkS, "The Farmer Protests--Populism," in Earl Schenck
Miers, The American Story, p. 224.
41 Ibid.
42Tracy, loco £!i., p. 248.
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agreed with the speaker or not, and many were introduced in
this manner to the idea of reform in government who formerly
had been complacent in the status quo.

The influence of

Coin's Financial School and the many'other books on free-silver
economies and finance published by the Populists and their
supporters was felt in thousands of homes, and these volumes
were read and discussed by many thousands of people who never
voted for the Populist ticket.

As Tracy observed, in 1893:

"The whole country has been filled with the desire and spirit
of investigation, and questions respeoting finance and governmental functions have been studied by men and women as they
are studied nowhere else in the world."43

Would this have

occurred if the Populists had not first publicized monetary
reform on the basis of free silver and suggested reforms in
the role of government in relation to the individual welfare?
This is a question for speculation.
Hindsight often makes experts of even the most unobservant, but hindsight also is valuable for the supposition at
hand.

That the Populists were first to

demonstr~te,

in 1892,

that great political capital could be made of the free silver
issue has been indicated, and that a money problem existed
even before the rise of Populism has been shown; the problem
remains, would the silver issue have become as dominant, with
its resulting influence upon the thinking of a great segment
of the American people, if Populism had not existed.

The

III

most logical answer seems to be probably not, for Populism
served as the catalyst which caused the reaction between

si~ver

miners in the West, farmers in the Middle Border, and farmers
of a different stamp in the South to make, in 1892, a strong
impression on the Democracy, which saw, in the more than one
million Populist votes, a lever by which to break the hold
of the conservative Northeastern faction of their party.

The

Populists served to stimulate the silverites within the Democratic party to renewed vigor, which ultimately led to the
"Cross of Gold," and to 1896.
In many other respects the Populists were great educators,
and continued their educational influence through fusion with
other groups.

In the realm of the relationship between the

individual and the government Populism introduced new ideas
and new concepts into the thinking of the nineteenth century.
The idea that the federal government has some responsibility
for the common weal was first introduced into modern American
political thinking by the People's Party,44 and the members
of the party, when they returned to the Republican or Democratic camps, following the decline of Populism, retained
their conviction that government intervention for the public
good was essential for the general welfare, even though the
official stand of the two parties at that time did not favor
those ideas.
44Hofstadter,

~

ABe £! Reform, p. 61.
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The political philosophy of t he American farmer was greatly
altered by Populism, and the idea of government assurance of
equal economic opportunity and the necessity of government
intervention remained even after Populism had gone. 45
The Populists! principles thoroughly infected the Damocrabic party, which, under Bryan's leadership "was nearly as
much Populist as Democratic."4 6 With the decline of Populist
strength and the ,switching of loyalties from the dying People's
Party to the revived Democracy under its new reform platform of
Chicago, new life was infused into the Democratic organization.
The one-time Populists found a welcome place in the Democratic
machine, where their views were accepted and their support
sought by their former opponents.

In Missouri, for example,

the former state Populist chairman, Albert Rozzelle, was appointed by a grateful Democratic state administration to the
post of State Labor Commissioner for his aid in securing
fusion between the two groups in that state in 1896, and he
later became an active supporter of the Bryan brand of Democracy in the state, acting as a state campaign
the Nebraskan during the 1900 race. 47

dir~ctor

for

Even the vitriolic

former senator, W. A. Peffer of Kansas, after an unsuccessful
try for the governorship of that state as a Prohibitionist,
eventually returned to the Republican ranks, for, as he observed in an editorial, "The same conditions that bred
45Clevenger, loco cit., p. 44.
46Hicks, "The Third Party Tradition in American Politics,"
loco cit., p. 20.
47personal interview with Mrs. Alice C. Rozzelle.
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Populism operated to extend its influence not only into the
ranks of the Democrats, but among Republicans as well.,,4 8
The influence of Populist ideas on the Democrats was sufficient to stifle the conservative element of that group, and
retain the principles of the Chicago platform through the campaign of 1900, when the Populist element was given credit for
being the "greatest obstacle n to blocking the success of the
conservative Eastern faction within the party in their attempt
to regain control at the 1900 convention.49

While the Popu-

lists did hold an independent nominating convention, at
Sioux Falls, South Dakota, they astutely remembered the mistake of 1896, and this time met in advance of the Democratic
convention.

They nominated Bryan and again advanced a free-

silver platform.

When the Democrats also nominated Bryan

and adopted the same platform they had placed themselves in the
position of merely seconding the Populist nomination, for the
People's Party had "nominated the presidential candidate for
the Democratic party and dictated its platform. n50 Far from
the position in which they found themselves

~

1896, they

had, by anticipating the Democrats, made the latter "merely
the endorsers of the Populist candidate and programme. n51
While this is perhaps an over-evaluation of the strength of
the Populists at that time, the fact remains that it was
4 8 The Farmers Advocate, VIII (November 11, 1896), 4.
49"The Populist Factions," loco cit., p. 647.
5 0n The Presidential Situation," Review of Reviews, XXI
(June, 1900), 648.
51~.
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Populist ideas which the Democrats adopted again in 1900 and
not the ideas of the conservatives, in spite of the defeat of
the Bryan group four years earlier.

Thus it would seem that

Populi am, while politically dead as an independent party,
still retained considerable influence on the Democrats, and
had advanced considerably in the ten years since they had first
adopted their Omaha platform.
The immediate effects upon the Grand Old Party, while not
so direct as upon the Democracy, were fully as pronounced, and
while the Republicans during this period on the national level
still opposed the basic Populist doctrines, fusion with the
Democrats had given the Populists a strength greatly out of
proportion to t heir numbers, and they used this strength to
influence the Republicans in the national government.

Popu-

lists within the Republican ranks by 1898, brought there
through the distaste many former Republican Populists had with
working with the Democrats which they would have had to do if
they had remained in their fused party, have been credited
with being one of the principal reasons for McKinley's decision to fight the war with Spain in 1898, to forestall a
threatened Populist outburst in the ranks of his own party.5 2
The influence of Populist ideas within the Grand Old Party
ranks has also been credited with the rise to prominence of
Theodore Roosevelt,53 whose espousal of many Populist ideas
caused concern in the minds of many of the more conservative
Republican leaders.

52HickS, "Th~ Third Party Tradition in American

Politics," loco cit., p. 20.
53 Ibid •
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The progressive movement, which Roosevelt headed, and
which so drastically altered Republican political thinking in
the early twentieth century, had its beginnings in the Populist movement, and the influence which this movement had on
the RepUblicans; and many of the planks of the reform platform
of the progressives can be traced back to the Populists, such
as the direct election of senators, the income tax, anti-trust
action, the initiative and referendum, and others. 54
The similarities between the traditional Republican
policy of protectionism, with its stress on home markets and
aid to home producers, and the Populist doctrine of government
aid for domestic farm producers are more pronounced than many
writers on this period have admitted; and the similarities
between the two may have been tacitly accepted by the RepUblicans as early as 1896, for while the RepUblicans in the Northeast opposed the Populists, they seemingly lent their approval
to Populist-Republican fusion efforts "wherever any political
advantage was to be gained. ,,55
crat explained:

As one bitter "gold-bug" Demo-

"It seems, from a Republican point of view,

that Populism is dangerous only when it coalesces with the
Democracy. ,,56
As early as 1894 the Populists had begun to exert their
influence on the Republicans on the state level, particularly
in Kansas, where the Republicans had been thoroughly shaken

5~ric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny, pp. 75-76.
55Hill, loco £!i., p. 65 7.
56 Ibid •
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by the People's Party victory in 1892.

Following their return

to power in 1894 the Grand Old Party was not as flagrant in
their disrespect for the multitude of rarmers which comprised
much of the electorate in Kansas; they "heeded the voice of
the people, and the ideals of the people were more nearly
achieved than before.,,57

But the change was not sufficient,

apparently, for the Kansas Grand Old Party was again unseated
in 1896.

The people wanted more evidence of conformity than

the Republicans at that time were willing to show, for the
state party was still dominated by an extreme conservatism.
The Republican view of Kansas Populism was perhaps most
eloquently expressed by William Allen White, whose bitter
anti-Populist editorials made him the recognized spokesman
for the Republicans throughout the state, and eventually
gained him nationwide recognition.

White called the Populists

"the American socialists," and alleged that they were "unhampered by scruples."5 8
Accusing the Populists of seeking
an Utopia, he claimed that if the people of Kansas could be
put to work, "at reasonably profitable work," the,Populists
"will be in search of an employment bureau."59

At the very

time this was being written (March, 1897), Kansas was already
entering upon the fourth period of Western history, and conditions were already beginning to improve.

The Populists

57walbourn, ~. ill., p. 90.
8
5 w. A. White, "Kansas, Its Present and Its Future,"
Forum, XXIII (March, 1897), 77.
59Ibid., p. 79.
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remained for White, however, the personification of their
candidates, which he had described in his famous editorial,
"What's the Matter with Kansas."

In this attack upon the

People's Party he described one of the party's candidates for
state office as follows:

"We have another shabby, wild-eyed,

rattle-brained fanatic who has said openly in a dozen speeches
that 'the rights of the user are paramount to the rights of
the owner;' we are running him for chief justice.,,60
Only ten years later, a far different William Allen
White, representing a far different brand of Republicanism,
wrote: "Judge Doster was right, but he was out too early in
the season and his views got frost bitten.,,61

The occasion

for this public retraction on White's part was an article
written by Andrew Carnegie, in which Carnegie reportedly
echoed the same philosophy which White such a short time before had derided.

White wrote:

"If Andrew Carnegie in the

campaign of 1896 had said what he is quoted as saying today,
he would have precipitated a panic, or a riot, or both•••• ,,62
On another occasion White wrote:
The other day a pamphlet came to the
Gazette which seemed about the right thing. It
was goIng after railroad discrimination. It
seemed sane and calm and well poised. The man
who wrote it seemed to have his head full of
fact ground through the wheels of logic. When,
10, and behold, the pamphlet was written and
60
White, 2£. cit., p. 298, contains the full text of
this famous editorfir.
61 Ibid ., p. 307.
62 Ibid •
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printed in 1890, and was written by Percy
Daniels!
The Populist Lieutenant Governor
of Kansas, 1893. The sun do move. This is
a funny world! 03
In another article, written in 1909, White attacks another
old Populist enemy, the trust, saying:
Just now in America great corporate combinations of capital in the trusts--the sneakthieving sugar trust, the cr1m1nal oil trust,
the sandbagging steel trust, the greedy wool
trust, the nefarious tobacco trust, the diabolical lumber trust--are robbing the American people. 64
In only ten years the Populists had risen from "wildeyed, rattle-brained fanatics" to political philosophers who
were "sane, calm and well poised."

Truly the influence which

the Populist ideas brought to bear on this one Kansas Republican was tremendous.

And the most unusual thing about it is

the fact that it was not rare.

The entire party, by 1904 was

standing behind these very ideas, and both the Republicans
and Democrats had forsaken the conservatism of the nineteenth
century for the progressivism of the twentieth.
By 1908, for example, twenty-seven states had already
ratified the proposed constitutional amendment calling for
direct election of United States Senators.

Of this number

there were both Republican and Democratic-controlled states,
as well as one brand-new state, Oklahoma.

The list includes

states where the Populists had been strong, such as Kansas,
and others where their direct influence had been negligible,
such as Indiana. 65
63Mahin, ~. cit., p. 275 (Quoting editorial, April 11,
1905) •
64 Ibi d ., p. 2 8 O.

65con~ressional Record, 60th Congress, Session 1, May

27-30, 190 , Appendix, pp. 266-268.
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Soon the reforms which the Populists had wanted were law.
The fusion had become complete--had become in fact union, and
with this union of members had come an assimilation of ideas
which enriched and benefited both the Republicans and Democrats, and which brought ultimate triumph to the Populists.
The triumph of Populist ideas was brought about by fusion's
influence.

The Populists themselves were not strong enough to

force their demands directly through by legislation, because
they were too few to elect a controlling block in the Congress.
Their allies were only temporary, and their greatest alliance
was made on an issue which in a few years had no basis, and
was soon forgotten.

It was by the influence which they exert-

ed on the other parties, following 1896, and on the American
electorate throughout their entire career, that Populism was
able to make its move, and was able to do so then more readily
because the Populists had already begun the great campaign of
education which prepared the American people for the radical
innovations which were soon being legislated by co-operative
congressmen of both parties.
Without fusion the Populists of the nineteenth century
would probably have been like the Socialists of the twentieth
--a small group urging a series of political changes upon an
American people which, on the whole, was unwilling to accept
their basic tenets.

By fusion, however, the Populists were

able to accomplish something which the Socialists have meah much
less able to do, legitimize their proposals with the label
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of an old, respected, and powerful political organization.
The Populists were Machiavellians--they were concerned with
achieving their desired ends, without concern for the means
by which they were to be achieved.

If their achievement

meant the destruction of their party, the party must be destroyed.

If their achlevement necessitated fusion with former

enemies, fusion there must be.

And if in fusion lay the means

by which their principles would be brought into concrete existence, then fusion would be the great salvation of Populism,
for the principles would live even if the party itself had to
die.

For, after all--"Parties ••• are born for principles,

not principles for parties, they are merely ladders upon which
truth and wisdom may climb for a season.,,66
This was the great idea of Populism, that it is tthe
ideal, the principle that is important, and not the party
label. And this is the great contribution of t he Populists,
who believed that ideas and beliefs, not parties, were the
most important part of American democracy; and if by changing
one's political loyalty, even by deserting or

de~troying

one's

party, the desired goals could be reached, then this was not
only the right but the obligatory thing to do.
The two parties have changed much since the l890 1 s,
have adopted new ideas and revised old ones to conform to
the wishes of the American people, and have worked to bring
to America a new concept of the role of government in the
66

Diggs,

££. cit., p. 58.
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lives of citizens, and a new interpretation of the Constitution
of the United States.

That the Populists were responsible for

a part of this is accepted by most historians--that by fusion
the Populists were able to play this'part should be an important lesson to anyone interested in political rerorm.

The

Populists fulfilled a definite need in the 1890's, a need for
reform and publicity for reform.

The day has not yet come

when that need has ceased to exist.
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APPENDIX I
Ocala Demands, December, 18901
1.

a.

We demand the abolition 'of national banks.

b. We demand that the government shall establish
sub-treasuries or depositories in the several states ••••
c. We demand that the amount of the circulating
medium be speedily increased to not less than 50 per capita.
2. We demand that Congress shall pass such laws as will
effectually prevent the dealing in futures of all agricultural
and mechanical productions ••••

3. We condemn the silver bill recently passed by Congress
and demand in lieu thereof t he free and unlimited coinage of
silver.

4. We demand the passage of laws prohibiting alien
ownership of land ••••
5. Believing in the doctrine of equal rights for all
and special privileges to none, we demand-a. That our national legislation shall be so framed
in the future as not to build up one industry at the expense
of another.
b. We further demand a removal of the existing heavy
tariff tax from the necessities of life, that the poor of our
land must have.
c. We further demand a just and equitable system of
graduated tax on incomes.
d. We ••• demand that all national and state revenues shall be limited to the necessary expenses of the government economically and honestly administered.
6. We demand the most rigid, honest, and just state and
national government control and supervision of the means of
public communication and transportation, and if this control
and supervision does not remove the abuse now existing, we
demand the government ownership of such means of communication
and transportation.
lCommager, ~. cit., pp. 142-143.
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7. We demand that the Congress of the United States
submit an amendment to the Constitution providing for the
election of United States Senators by direct vote of the
people of each state.
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A PENDIX II
Financial planks, Populist Party Platform, 1892

1

FINANCE. - We demand a national ~urrency, safe, sound,
and flexible, issued by the general government only, a full
legal tender for all debts, public and p ri vate, and that
without the use of banking corporations; a just. equitable,
and efficient means of distribution direct to the people,
at a tax not to exceed 2 per cent per anntun, to be provided
as set forth in the sub-treasury plan of the Farmers' Alliance,
or a better system; also by payments in discharge of its
obligations for public improvement.
1. We demand free and unlimited coinage of silver and
gold at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1.
2. We demand that the amount of circulation medium be
speedily increased to notless than $50 per capita.
3.

We demand a graduated income tax.

4. We believe that the money of the country should be
kept as much as possible in the hands of the people, and hence
we demand that all State and national revenues shall be limited
to the necessary expenses of the government, economically and
honestly administered.
5. We demand that postal savings banks be established
by the government for the safe deposit of the earnings of the
people and to facilitate exchange.
lCommager. ,2£.

ill.• pp. l44-145.
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APPENDIX III
Financial Plank, Republican Platrorm, 18961
The Republican party is unreservedly ror sound money.
It caused the enactment or a law providing ror the resumption
or specie payments in 1879. Since then every dollar has been
as good as gold. We are unalterably opposed to every measure
calculated to debase our currency or impair the credit or our
ountry. We are thererore opposed to the rree coinage or
silver, except by international arrangement with the leading
commercial nations or the earth, which agreement we pledge
ourselves to promote, and until such agreement can be obtained
the existing gold standard must be maintained. Allor our
silver and paper currency must be maintained at parity with
gold, and we ravor all measures designated to maintain inviolable the obligations or the United States, or all our money.
whether coin or paper, at the present standard or most
enlightened nations or the world••••
1

Commager,

~.

£11.,

p. 174.
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AF-PENDIX IV

Financial Plank, Democratic Platform, 1896
We declare that the act of 1873 'demonetizing silver
without the knowledge or approval of the American people l
has resulted in the appreciation of gold and a corresponding
fall in the prices of commoditiesproduced by the people;
a heavy increase in the burdens of taxation and of. all debts,
pUblic and private; the enrichment of the money-lending class
at home and abroad; the prostration of industry and impoverishment of the people.
We. are unalterably opposed to monometallism which has
locked fast the prosperity of an industrial people in the
paralysis of hard times. Gold monometalism is a British
policy, and its adoption has brought other nations into
financial'servitude to London. It is not only un-American
but anti-American, and it can be fastened on the United
States only by the stifling of that spirit and love of
liberty which proclaimed our political independence in 1776
and won it in the War of the Revolution.
We demand the free and unlimited coinage of both silver
and gold at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1 without
waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation. We
demand that the standard silver dollar shall be a full
legal tender, equally with gold for all debts, public and
private, and we favor such legislation as will prevent for the
futUre the demonetization of any kind of legal tender money by
private contract. 2
lSee ~ressional Globe, 42nd Congress, SesBion 3,
1872-1873, 668-674 for a dIscussion of the demonetizing of
silver. In spite of the contention that it was done without
the "knowledge" of the American people the debates on the
issue in Congress were quite public. The thing the lawmakers did not know, and the people were equally ignorant,
was that the price of silver was soon to drop so precipitously.
2

Commager,

~.

cit., p. 178.
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APPENDIX V
Fusion Electoral Tickets, 18961
States
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota

Democratic Populist
electors
electors

5
5
2

5

2
20
10
10
10*
11

4

13
9

4

3

4

1
1
1

4
5
3

2

4
2
4
5

States

Democratic Populist
electors
electors

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Jersey
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Utah
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

13
1

4
9
5

18
2*
28
1
2

4
9
2

4
2
4

1
6
3*

5
2

4
2
2
2
3
1

*Kansas - The Democratic ticket was endorsed by the
Populists, the electors to vote as they pleased for vice-president.
*North Dakota - Populists endorsed the Democratic electors
in return for state officers.
*Oregon - One Silver Republican elector.

lAppleton1s Annual Cyclopedia, 1896, p. 770.
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